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COVID-19 spread to 189 countries and infected tens of millions of people in the matter 
of months. Organizations, including governments and employers, turned to health 
surveillance technologies to slow the spread and combat the disease. Protected health 
information and personal information are required for the proper and effective functioning 
of the health surveillance technologies. The collection, use, and dissemination of protected 
health and personal information raised data privacy and security concerns. But under the 
current data privacy and security regime—based on the reasonable expectation of privacy 
standard—protected health and personal information is not protected to the extent that it 
needs to be.  
 Unlike other scholarly work, this article presents deeper analysis into the 
technologies, the data that powers them, and the applicable legal standards. The objective 
is to provide a better understanding of (i) the data privacy and security risks, and (ii) 
whether the current data privacy and security regime in the United States provides 
sufficient protections for individuals.  
This article explores two health surveillance technologies (contact tracing applications 
and health monitoring platforms), presents three categories of data (user-inputted, queried, 
and autogenerated data), and describes the data supply chains that power technology and 
organizations. I discuss the benefits and risks of collecting the protected health and 
personal information in response to the pandemic. I explore the current legal standards and 
jurisprudence, and I propose the Privacy Continuum to explain how the pandemic shifted 
the reasonable expectation of privacy. I present a case study to synthesize the foregoing, 
and I conclude by proposing a new legal standard—the right to control—and other reforms 
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On January 30, 2020, the World Health Organization (“WHO”) declared the 
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (“COVID-19”) outbreak a “public health emergency of 
international concern,” and shortly thereafter, the WHO declared the outbreak a global 
pandemic.1  On March 13, 2020, the President of the United States, Donald Trump, 
declared that the COVID-19 outbreak constituted a national emergency.2  
As of November 2020, over 45 million people have been diagnosed with COVID-19 
across 189 countries; over 1,200,000 of them have died.3  In response to the pandemic, 
organizations, businesses, governments, and communities around the world mobilized to 
not only detect and contain the virus, but develop techniques (or methods) to treat those 
diagnosed with the disease.4  Unlike past pandemics, the COVID-19 pandemic is occurring 
in a more connected and digitized world.5  Accordingly, governments around the world 
have turned to technology to aid in their detection, containment, and treatment efforts 
relating to COVID-19.6 
Israel tasked its intelligence agency to track COVID-19 patients by leveraging telecom 
data.7 The United Kingdom deployed law enforcement drones to monitor public spaces and 
enforce social distancing practices.8  Hong Kong and India installed geofencing technology 
to enforce quarantine zones.9  South Korea, China, Taiwan, and many other countries, 
deployed smartphone applications for contact tracing.10  Like other counties, United States 
politicians, businesses, and non-governmental organizations have called for or are 
 
1 Timeline of WHO’s Response to COVID-19, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Sept. 9, 2020), 
https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/29-06-2020-covidtimeline; See International Health Regulations 
(IHR), CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, GLOBAL HEALTH PROTECTION & SECURITY (Aug. 19, 2019), 
https://www.cdc.gov/globalhealth/healthprotection/ghs/ihr/index.html (discussing the International Health 
Regulations [IHR] aim to keep the world informed about public health risks and events by requiring countries 
to have the ability to detect, assess, report, and respond to public health events). 
2 Proclamation on Declaring a National Emergency Concerning the Novel Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) 
Outbreak, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Mar. 13, 2020), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/proclamation-
declaring-national-emergency-concerning-novel-coronavirus-disease-covid-19-outbreak/.  
3 COVID-19 Dashboard by the Center for Systems Science and Engineering (CSSE) at John Hopkins University 
(JHU), JOHNS HOPKINS U. (Oct. 10, 2020, 1:23 PM), https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html (“JHU Dashboard” 
provides case counts of confirmed and probable cases and the total number of cases and deaths are likely 
undercounts). 
4 See generally LEESA LIN & ZHIYUAN HOU, Combat COVID-19 with Artificial Intelligence and Big Data, J. OF 
TRAVEL MED. 1-4 (May 21, 2020), https://www.doi.org/10.1093/jtm/taaa080. 
5 Marcello Ienca & Effy Vayena, On the Responsible Use of Digital Data to Tackle the COVID-19 Pandemic, 
NATURE MED. 463 (Mar. 27, 2020), https://www.nature.com/articles/s41591-020-0832-5; See Past Pandemics, 
CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, INFLUENZA (FLU) (Aug. 10, 2020), 
https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-resources/basics/past-pandemics.html. 
6 SEE Liza Lin & Timothy W. Martin, How Coronavirus Is Eroding Privacy, WALL ST. J., (Apr. 15, 2020, 11:03 
AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/coronavirus-paves-way-for-new-age-of-digital-surveillance-
11586963028. 
7 Id. at 1, 3. 
8 Id. at 1. 
9 Id. at 1. 
10  Id. (explaining that contact tracing is the process of identifying individuals who may have close contact with 
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deploying various technologies to contain the spread of the virus.11  While this article 
references efforts by other countries, it focuses specifically on the United States.   
Protected Health Information (“PHI”) is at the core of the technologies leveraged in 
the fight against COVID-19.12  In aggregate, PHI is leveraged for data modeling, contact 
tracing, quarantine enforcement, symptom tracking, and the like.13  However, privacy and 
security concerns regarding the collection, use, and dissemination of PHI are widespread..14 
Individuals may believe that their PHI is protected under statutory, regulatory, or 
constitutional protections (e.g., the Heath Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
[“HIPAA”] or the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution).  Individuals may trust the 
data collectors’ privacy, cybersecurity protocols, and technologies that are designed to 
protect Personal Information (“PI”) or PHI.15  But as individuals’ willingness to share their 
PHI increases because of the pandemic, is their PHI and PI truly protected?16  And if so, to 
what extent?  
This article discusses the data privacy and security issues with respect to health 
surveillance technologies within the United States.  This article is not an exhaustive 
analysis of the health surveillance technologies or the legality or constitutionality of the 
technologies. However, unlike other scholarly work, this article is a deeper analysis into 
 
11 See generally Adam Cancryn, Kushner’s Team Seeks National Coronavirus Surveillance System, POLITICO, 
(Apr. 8, 2020, 12:19 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/04/07/kushner-coronavirus-surveillance-
174165 (describing the containment and surveillance efforts by the federal government and how it will use 
various technologies to combat COVID-19; I use the term “organizations” interchangeably with “companies” 
and “businesses” throughout this article. At times, I use the term “organizations” to include governments). 
12 See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (PHI includes information that (i) identifies, or can reasonably be used to identify, 
an individual; (ii) is created or received by a covered entity [e.g., health plan, health care provider, employer, 
or health care clearinghouse]; (iii) relates to an individual’s physical or mental health, health care provision, or 
payment for provision of health care; and (iv) is transmitted by or maintained in electronic or any other format).   
13 See generally Carmel Shachar, Protecting Privacy in Digital Contact Tracing for COVID-19: Avoiding a 
Regulatory Patchwork, HEALTH AFFAIRS, (May 19, 2020), 
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20200515.190582/full/; See also Marcello Ienca & Effy 
Vayena supra note 5. 
14 See Cancryn supra note 11; AARON R. BROUGH & KELLY D. MARTIN, Consumer Privacy During (and After) 
the COVID-19 Pandemic, J. OF PUB. POL’Y & MKTG. (May 28, 2020), 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0743915620929999; Stephen P. Mulligan et al., DATA PROTECTION LAW: AN 
OVERVIEW, CONG. RES. SERV., (2019) (Data privacy relates to the control, use, and dissemination of personal 
information and PHI.  Data security relates to (i) the protection of personal information and/or PHI from 
unauthorized access or use, and (ii) the response to the unauthorized access or use of the personal information 
or PHI); See also Chris D. Linebaugh, FACEBOOK’S $5 BILLION PRIVACY SETTLEMENT WITH THE FEDERAL 
TRADE COMMISSION, CONG. RES. SERV., (2019) (Data privacy and security concerns vary by person—not 
everyone has the same level of concern—and some may have no privacy expectations). 
15 See Art. 4 Global Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”) Definitions, (EU) (Data collectors are organizations 
that collect or store PI and PHI.  For this article, data collectors include data processors [organizations that 
conduct a series of actions or operations using the data] and data controllers [organizations that determine the 
purposes and means of the data processing]); See also Definition of Processes, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/processes. (last visited Oct. 10, 2020) (For this article, an 
example of PHI is a positive diagnosis of COVID-19, and two examples of personal information (“PI”) are an 
individual’s name and address). 
16 Anindya Ghose, et al., Trading Privacy for the Greater Social Good: How Did America React During 
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the health surveillance technologies and the applicable legal standards; the objective is to 
provide a better understanding of (i) the data privacy and security risks, and (ii) whether 
the current data privacy and security regime in the United States provides sufficient 
protections for individuals. 
Part I discusses the health surveillance technologies.  Part II explores various legal 
standards and jurisprudence with respect to data privacy and security and how privacy 
expectations have shifted and continue to do so since the pandemic began.  Part II proposes 
a framework to visualize the legal standards and show the shift in privacy expectations.  
Part III presents a case study to show the legal standards as applied to deployed health 
surveillance technologies.  Part IV argues that the current data privacy and security regime 
is ineffective and unworkable, and it proposes reforms to the data privacy and security 
regime to effectuate real consumer protections.  
II. THE COVID-19 SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGIES 
 
The COVID-19 disease spread to 188 countries and infected 28.5 million people in 
less than six months.17 With the infectiousness of COVID-19, governments and 
organizations have turned to health surveillance technologies to help track and contain the 
spread.18  At the core of these technologies is PI and PHI.  And this data has quickly become 
more relevant and valuable during the pandemic for policy planning, workforce planning, 
diagnostics, stay-at-home order enforcement, and more.19  The collection, use, and 
dissemination of this data raises data privacy and security concerns. 
This Part I describes various health surveillance technologies, including how these 
technologies incorporate data privacy and security. Section A details two technologies: (i) 
contact tracing applications, and (ii) health monitoring platforms. Section B considers the 
data and data supply chains that underlay these technologies, including user-inputted data, 
queried data, and autogenerated data.20  Lastly, Section C discusses the data privacy and 
security benefits and risks.  
A. An Overview of Two Technologies in the COVID-19 Pandemic 
Many technologies have been developed and deployed in response to the COVID-19 
pandemic.  But at least two technologies are concerning to privacy advocates and scholars: 
contact tracing applications and health monitoring platforms.  This Section A provides an 
overview of these technologies, including some of the benefits and risks with respect to the 
data collection, use, and dissemination.  
 
17 See JMU DASHBOARD, supra note 3. 
18 Theodore Claypoole, COVID-19 and Data Privacy: Health vs. Privacy, A.B.A.(Mar. 26, 2020), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2020/04/health-vs-privacy/. 
19  Cynthia Dwork, et al., On Privacy in the Age of COVID-19, J. OF PRIVACY & CONFIDENTIALITY (June 25, 
2020), https://doi.org/10.29012/jpc.749. 
20 A data supply chain is the end-to-end flow of data across systems and technologies, including data suppliers 
and end-users. User-inputted data is data that is provided by the user (e.g., email address when creating a new 
account). Queried data is data obtained by the data processor by third-party data suppliers. Autogenerated data 
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First, contact tracing applications are smartphone-based mobile applications that 
supplement or replace conventional contact tracing.21  Conventional contact tracing 
involves manual interviews of infected individuals, conducted by public health authorities, 
that aim to collect information regarding who the infected individual physically contacted 
since becoming infected.22 Because manual interviews of infected individuals are very 
difficult to scale during a global pandemic and alternative options exist today, governments 
and other organizations have turned to smartphone contact tracing applications that utilize 
geolocation data, either by the phone’s Bluetooth, WiFi, or GPS.23 
Organizations quickly developed and released contact tracing applications. Apple and 
Google partnered to develop the “Exposure Notification System,” (“ENS”) a privacy-
preserving technology that uses Bluetooth, to help public health officials develop and 
launch their own contact tracing applications.24 The ENS allows for iOS and Android 
devices to exchange beacons (similar to exchanging business cards) with other devices that 
have the ENS-based application installed.25 For instance, if Jane Doe comes into contact 
with an infected individual (i.e., an individual who tested positive for COVID-19), then 
Jane Doe is notified via the ENS-based application by public health authorities.26 
But Apple and Google are not the only organizations developing contact tracing 
technologies. In less than a month after the pandemic declaration, the Peruvian government 
launched a mobile application that uses GPS data for contact tracing.27 Two months after 
the declaration, the South Korean government launched two applications, one of which 
was created by private developers.28 Singapore, India, Israel, Hong Kong, Italy, and others 
also launched contact tracing applications since the pandemic began.29  
In the United States, several contact tracing applications appeared on Google’s Play 
and Apple’s App Stores, some of which were not tied to a public health agency or 
 
21 Nadeem Ahmed, et al., A Survey of COVID-19 Contact Tracing Apps, CORNELL U., ARXIV.ORG (July 28, 
2020), https://arxiv.org/abs/2006.10306. 
22 Ahmed, supra note 21, at 27 (explaining that contact tracing plays an important role in the control of 
infectious diseases, and how its value is widely accepted in public health globally); See Don Klinkenberg, et 
al., The Effectiveness of Contact Tracing in Emerging Epidemics, PLOS ONE (Dec. 20, 2006), 
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0000012; Contact Tracing, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (May 9, 2017), 
https://www.who.int/news-room/q-a-detail/contact-tracing.   
23 Tony Romm, et al., U.S. Government, Tech Industry Discussing Ways to Use Smartphone Location Data to 
Combat Coronavirus, WASH. POST (March 17, 2020, 6:15 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/03/17/white-house-location-data-coronavirus/.  
24 Ryan Chiavetta, Google, Apple Outline Privacy Considerations for Exposure Notification System, INT’L 
ASS’N OF PRIVACY PROF’LS (June 26, 2020), https://iapp.org/news/a/google-apple-outline-privacy-
considerations-within-exposure-notification-system/.   
25 Id.  
26 Id. 
27 Catherine Escobedo, Geolocation and Other Personal Data Used in the Fight Against COVID-19, INT’L 
ASS’N OF PRIVACY PROF’LS (last visited Oct 8, 2020), https://iapp.org/news/a/geolocation-and-other-personal-
data-used-in-the-fight-against-covid-19/.  
28 Samantha Tsang, Here Are the Contact Tracing Apps Being Deployed Around the World, INT’L ASS’N OF 
PRIVACY PROF’LS (Apr. 28, 2020), https://iapp.org/news/a/here-are-the-contact-tracing-apps-being-employed-
around-the-world/. 
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authority.30 Attorneys General from nearly forty states, as well as other policymakers and 
regulators, recognized that while contact tracing applications aid in combating the spread 
of COVID-19, many private companies may exploit the pandemic to collect PI or PHI.31 
New York’s Attorney General, Letitia James, said, “some companies may seek to take 
advantage of consumers and use [PI] to advertise, mine [the] data, and unethically profit 
off this pandemic,” and many likely do not know who or what is behind the efforts.32 But 
regardless of whether the effort is a public-private partnership or wholly private endeavor, 
these efforts have received criticism from the general public and privacy experts regarding 
the data privacy and security capabilities.33 The criticism is warranted because these 
applications collect, use, and disseminate PI and PHI. 
Second, health monitoring platforms are software solutions that enable organizations 
to collect, store, and monitor PHI.34 While the term “health monitoring platforms” is broad, 
for this article, I consider only the platforms that can be leveraged in response to the 
pandemic and are consumer-facing. 
Health monitoring platforms have various purposes, features, and capabilities. For 
example, Safe Health Systems, Inc. (“SAFE”) sells a platform that provides diagnostics, 
health record management, provider services, and the like.35 FamHis, Inc. sells a white 
label platform (more on white label platforms below), FamGenix, that focuses on collecting 
family health history information.36 Advancia Technologies and RingMD jointly sell a 
COVID-19 risk mitigation platform that allows for patient risk assessments, triage, and 
contact tracing.37 And in April 2020, Pager, Inc. (“Pager”) released its white label COVID-
19 solution that offers health providers triage, risk assessment, and telemedicine 
capabilities.38  
Other software platforms may not be designed for healthcare applications, yet they 
incorporate features and capabilities that are valuable to the pandemic’s response. For 
example, human capital management (“HCM”) platforms are designed for human 
resources departments to manage new employee onboarding, payroll, compensation, and 
the like. But many HCM platforms, like the Dayforce product from Ceridian HCM, Inc., 
have features that map the location of employees.39 Employee mapping help employers 
 
30 Allison Grande, Apple, Google Urged to Ax COVID-19 Apps With No Gov’t Ties, LAW360 (June 16, 2020, 
10:25 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1283641/apple-google-urged-to-ax-covid-19-apps-with-no-gov-
t-ties.  
31 See generally id. 
32 Grande, Supra note 30. 
33 See Chiavetta, supra note 24. 
34 Rachel Ranosa, COVID-19: 6 Apps to Monitor Employee Health, HUM. RES. DIR. (Apr. 22, 2020), 
https://www.hcamag.com/us/specialization/hr-technology/covid-19-6-apps-to-monitor-employee-
health/220371. 
35 SAFE HEALTH SYSTEMS, INC., https://safehealth.me (last visited Oct 8, 2020). 
36 FAMHIS, INC., https://famgenix.com/white-label/ (last visited Oct 8, 2020). 
37 COVID-19 Needs & Resources Matching, NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N, (last visited Oct 8, 2020), 
https://www.nga.org/coronavirus-resources/. 
38 PRESS RELEASE, Pager’s New COVID-19 Solution Aims to Help Flatten the Curve, PAGER INC. (Apr. 2, 
2020), https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20200402005294/en/Pager’s-New-COVID-19-Solution-
Aims-Flatten-Curve. 
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understand whether their employees are at home or at the office, the chances of exposure 
to the virus, and the risk of infection.40  
Health monitoring platforms can be white label platforms—fully developed and 
supported software solutions made by one company but sold to and used by another 
company.41 For example, a multinational corporation may embed the Pager platform into 
its internal mobile application, and it could require all of its employees to complete an 
initial risk assessment before its employees can return to the office.42 A high risk employee 
may be prohibited from returning to the office.43 White label platforms significantly reduce 
the development requirements, which in turn, allow organizations to deploy a solution 
more quickly.44  
Like contact tracing applications, the health monitoring platforms collect PI and PHI. 
In the employer-employee example, the employee submits multiple data elements, such as 
symptom status, health history, or travel history. The data is collected and stored by the 
platform provider (e.g., Pager) or the employer.45 This raises data privacy and security 
concerns.46 Using a platform, or manually collecting this data, employers can collect 
significant amounts of PHI from its employees, which can be vulnerable to data privacy or 
security risks if improperly collected, accessed, handled, used, or processed.47  
The technologies deployed to combat the spread of COVID-19 are becoming the next 
treasure trove of PI and PHI. These are two examples; other technologies are omitted from 
this overview, but nonetheless, others are collecting the PI and PHI. With the collection, 
use, and dissemination of PI and PHI via these technologies and the organizations behind 
them, the concerns about data privacy and security are warranted. To better understand 
why data privacy and security concerns are warranted, I turn to an overview of the data and 
data supply chains.  
B. An Overview of the Data and the Data Supply Chains of COVID-19 
Technologies 
Data is at the core of the technologies deployed to combat COVID-19. A technology 
solution is only as valuable as the data the solution collects, stores, and uses to deliver its 
capabilities and meaningful insights to organizational leaders.48 This Section B presents an 
 
40 Id.  
41 Drew Gainor, Why a White Label Solution Is Easier Than Building Your Own, FORBES (June 3, 2014, 9:00 
AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/theyec/2014/06/03/why-a-white-label-solution-is-easier-than-building-
your-own/#14e8aa3bdd9e.  
42 See generally Gainor, supra note 41. 
43 See generally id.  
44 See Carla Tardi, White Label Product, INVESTOPEDIA (last updated July 7, 2020), 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/w/white-label-product.asp.  
45 See, e.g., NGA ADVANCIA AND RINGMD PRESENTATION, supra note 37 (the Advancia and RingMD platform 
is hosted by cloud providers [e.g., Amazon Web Services] or on-premise [i.e., in the deploying company’s data 
centers and servers]).  
46 See generally, Jedidiah Bracy, OSHA Revises Guidance on Tracking COVID-19 in the Workplace, INT’L 
ASS’N OF PRIVACY PROF’LS (June 1, 2020), https://iapp.org/news/a/osha-releases-guidance-on-tracking-covid-
19-in-the-workplace/.  
47 See generally id. 
48 Other technologies (e.g., thermal imaging, biometrics, telemedicine, 3D printing, etc.) deployed to combat 
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overview of data and data supply chains to illustrate the data ecosystem.49 Without the 
understanding of the data ecosystem, one is limited in evaluating the data privacy and 
security risks.50 And without the understanding of the risks, one cannot form effective 
protections for individuals against those risks.51 
I start by distinguishing data into three categories—user-inputted, queried, and 
autogenerated. Next, I describe how the data categories play into a company’s data supply 
chain. Last, I detail how companies use the data while leveraging other technologies, such 
as machine learning (“ML”) and artificial intelligence (“AI”).  
There are three types of data: (1) user-inputted data, (2) queried data, and (3) 
autogenerated data (Figure 1). User-inputted data includes basic data elements that a user 
provides the software or application herself (e.g., name, email, phone). Queried data 
includes the data about an individual that is sourced from third parties. For example, to 
open a credit account at a bank, the bank will query data from a credit bureau (e.g., credit 
history and score) before decisioning the credit application. Autogenerated data is 
generated and collected about an individual through automation (e.g., behavioral analytics 
of a user and her interactions with a website). For Figure 1, I use the Five Building Blocks 
of Identity (Figure 1.1) (“Building Blocks”) to describe how the three categories of data 
are used.52  
  
 
Technologies in the Fight Against COVID-19: An Infographic, MEDICAL FUTURIST (May 7, 2020), 
https://medicalfuturist.com/the-top-5-practical-digital-health-technologies-in-the-fight-against-covid-19-an-
infographic/.  
49 The term “data supply chain” includes the end-to-end processes, systems, and organizations used to collect, 
store, use, and disseminate data. This could include data providers, such as data brokers, and data storage 
providers, such as Amazon Web Services. This could also include data processors, such as ML / AI providers 
that process the data to derive analytics, insights, and the like. 
50 See infra Part I.C. 
51 See infra Part IV.  
52 Kaelyn Lowmaster, ET AL., Digital Identity: The Foundation for Trusted Transactions in Financial Services, 
CAPCO (Apr. 30, 2018), https://www.capco.com/Capco-Institute/Journal-47-Digitization/Digital-Indentity-
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we prove who 
you are? 
How do we 
know it is still 
you? 
What do 
you get once we 
know it is you? 
How can 
we tell other 
people it is 
you? 
 
Individuals often believe that the data collected by companies is either (i) the data that 
a user inputs into the software (e.g., name), or (ii) the data that the user generates via her 
interactions with the software that the user can see (e.g., total dollar amount of an 
eCommerce transaction).54 But this is an elementary understanding of the data ecosystem 
because user-inputted data is only a part of picture—it neglects queried data and 
autogenerated data.55  
While the majority of Americans acknowledge they are being tracked, 79% of adults 
state they have little to no understanding about what the government does with their data, 
and this is likely the same percentage with respect to the private sector.56 For instance, 
when asked about what privacy means, one survey respondent stated, “My personal 
information is secure. No one knows my credit card numbers, address info, where I have 
been, my banking info, my health info, etc. People don’t know anything about me I do not 
 
54 For this article, user-inputted data includes both the data that a user inputs into the software and the data that 
the user generates via her interactions with the software. The latter is distinguished from autogenerated data 
because autogenerated data is not necessarily produced as an outcome of a user’s inputs or interactions with 
the software—this data the user can see for herself or himself. For instance, while an eCommerce transaction’s 
total dollar amount is automatically calculated, the calculation is a result of the user’s input, and autogenerated 
data could be the browsing analytics (e.g., how long a user remains on a page, the clickthrough rates, etc.) that 
the user cannot see herself.  
55 See Emily Stewart, Lawmakers Seem Confused About What Facebook Does – and How to Fix It, VOX (Apr. 
10, 2018), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/4/10/17222062/mark-zuckerberg-testimony-
graham-facebook-regulations (detailing the lack of understanding by Congress and stating, “[p]lenty of people 
have a very limited notion of how exactly Facebook’s business works, what happens to their data, and what 
they can do to increase their privacy.”); See, e.g., Brittany Martin, Note, The Unregulated Underground Market 
for Your Data: Providing Adequate Protections for Consumer Privacy in the Modern Era, 105 IOWA L. REV. 
865, 870-72 (2020) (explaining that data brokers get data from publicly available records kept by governments, 
social media and blogs, and commercial sources (e.g., retailers). But Martin’s article fails to consider queried 
and autogenerated data that most users are not aware is being tracked, stored, used, and disseminated).  
56 Brooke Auxier et al., Americans and Privacy: Concerned, Confused and Feeling Lack of Control Over Their 
Personal Information 10, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Nov. 15, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/wp-
content/uploads/sites/9/2019/11/Pew-Research-Center_PI_2019.11.15_Privacy_FINAL.pdf (a total of 4,272 
panelists responded to the survey out of the 5,869 sampled. The survey was conducted between June 3-17, 
2020, with the response rate of 73%. The margin of sampling error for the 4,272 respondents is ±1.9%. For the 
survey’s methodology, See AUXIER at 46-47. “Tracked” means the monitoring by companies and the 
government with some regularity); See also Brian Mastroianni, Survey: More Americans Worried About Data 
Privacy Than Income, CBS NEWS (Jan. 28, 2016), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/truste-survey-more-
americans-concerned-about-data-privacy-than-losing-income/ (discussing a survey by TRUSTe/National 
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intend to share.”57 This response demonstrates an elementary understanding of what data 
is collected—if the concept of data privacy for 79% of Americans extends insofar as 
surface-level PI, such as credit card numbers, then it suggests that 79% of Americans are 
likely not aware of the totality of data at play.  
User-inputted data is only a piece of the pie—an organization can query user-inputted 
data to obtain more PI than what the user provided. For instance, Company X may collect 
the name, address, and email address from the user, and it can query these data elements 
with a third-party provider, such as Neustar, Inc. (“Neustar”).58 Company X sends Neustar 
the data elements, Neustar’s product matches the individual with its database, and then 
Neustar populates any missing data, such as the individual’s telephone number, age, 
gender, income level, etc.59 The data that Neustar provides Company X is the queried data.  
Both Company X and its third-party data provider form Company X’s data supply 
chain—Neustar being a data supplier to Company X. Company X maintains a more 
extensive data supply chain. Company X may want to track the behavioral data and 
analytics (autogenerated data) of its users who visit its website or use its mobile application. 
Company X could use Hotjar Ltd.’s (“Hotjar”) product that provides Company X with user 
heatmaps, funnels, recordings, and more.60 With Hotjar, Company X can track how users 
click-through, tap, and scroll through its website.61 It can identify where its users are exiting 
the website using Hotjar’s funnel feature.62 And with Hotjar’s Recording feature, Company 
X can watch recordings of users’ interactions and behaviors on its website.63 By embedding 
Hotjar into its platform, Company X autogenerates data—data that many individuals are 
likely not aware of given the 79% of Americans who hold a limited understanding of data 
collection.64 
 Now, Company X has two data suppliers—Neustar and Hotjar—each providing 
Company X with different sets of information that Company X can leverage for decisioning 
(Figure 2). But a user may not care about the traditional PI and behavioral analytics 
tracking. The user may be more concerned with her geolocation data because geolocation 
data is more sensitive than traditional PI; 82% of adults feel that the details of their physical 
location is somewhat or very sensitive.65 Even the Supreme Court recognizes geolocation 
data is of great concern with respect to one’s privacy.66 
 
57 Auxier, supra note 56, at 13. 
58 See NEUSTAR, INC., https://www.cdn.neustar/resources/product-literature/marketing/neustar-marketing-
customer-identity-file-solution-sheet.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2020) (Neustar provides real-time data to 
organizations across four main product lines: marketing, risk, communications, and security solutions). 
59 Id. 
60 See HOTJAR LTD., https://www.hotjar.com (last visited Oct. 9, 2020).  
61 See Heatmaps, HOTJAR LTD., https://www.hotjar.com/tour/#heatmaps (last visited Oct. 9, 2020).  
62 See Conversion Funnels, HOTJAR LTD., (last visited July 22, 2020).   
63 See Visitor Recordings, HOTJAR LTD., https://www.hotjar.com/tour/#recordings (last visited Oct. 9, 2020).  
64 See Auxier, supra note 56.  
65 Mary Madden, Americans Consider Certain Kinds of Data to Be More Sensitive than Others, PEW RSCH. 
CTR. (Nov. 12, 2014), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2014/11/12/americans-consider-certain-kinds-of-
data-to-be-more-sensitive-than-others/. 
66 See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2218 (2018) (recognizing that when the Government tracks 
the geolocation data of one’s cell phone, the Government “achieves near perfect surveillance, as if [the 
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 Turning back to the Neustar example, Company X may automatically collect the 
IP address when the user visits its website. Company X can send the IP address to Neustar, 
and Neustar can return more than 40 data elements including the IP’s continent, country, 
state, city, zip code, latitude and longitude.67 Company X can identify the user’s 
geolocation to the specific longitude and latitude using just the user’s IP address. 
 A user’s geolocation is autogenerated data and is critical to digital contact 
tracing.Mobile devices locate themselves using a variety of signals from satellites (GPS), 
cell towers, WiFi networks, Bluetooth signals, and proximity to other devices.68 Carriers, 
the device’s operating system, applications, data brokers, other third parties use the 
geolocation data from a mobile device.69 Even if a user’s PI is removed from the data set 
(e.g., if Company X separates a user’s name from her geolocation data), geolocation data 
can be traced back to the specific user because geolocation data contains information 
regarding the user’s “sensitive locations,” such as the user’s home and office locations.70 
 
(recognizing that modern cell phones “implicate privacy concerns far beyond those implicated by the search of 
a cigarette pack, wallet, or purse.”). 
67 See UltraGeoPoint Provides Insight into 99.99% of All Routable IP Addresses, NEUSTAR, INC. 1 (May 12, 
2020), https://www.cdn.neustar/resources/product-literature/security/neustar-ip-geopoint-solution-sheet.pdf. 
68 Stacey Gray, The World of Geolocation Data, FUTURE OF PRIVACY F. (May 22, 2020), 
https://fpf.org/2020/05/22/understanding-the-world-of-geolocation-data/. 
69 Id.  
70 Id.; See Sarah Underwood, Can You Locate Your Location Data?, COMMC’NS OF THE ACM (Sept. 2019), 
https://www.doi.org/10.1145/3344291 (detailing how users often lack the awareness that mobile applications 
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 It is possible for autogenerated data to be sourced from a third party. In other 
words, what is queried data for one organization may be autogenerated data for another 
organization. For example, even though the Secret Service does not collect geolocation 
data itself, it sources the data from third party suppliers—often avoiding the warrant 
requirement.71 
 This data (user-inputted, queried, and autogenerated data) can be combined with 
other technologies, such as ML and AI. Public health authorities, researchers, and experts 
are leveraging ML-based technologies to study COVID-19, test potential treatments, 
diagnose patients, analyze public impacts of the pandemic, and model the spread of 
COVID-19.72  
For example, Chinese doctors used AI to leverage data from the first onset of COVID-
19 to detect disease using chest CT scans.73 Their efforts resulted in a deep learning model 
that accurately detects COVID-19 and differentiates it from other lung diseases.74 The 
construction of any deep learning module with this objective requires big data sets of 
individuals’ PI and PHI.75 
For these technologies to function properly, the software requires the user’s PI and PHI 
to develop and test the application. Moreover, ML and AI require massive data sets to train 
the software and its functionality.76 Here, the software is only as valuable as the data the 
software collects, stores, and uses. It is not unforeseeable that this data could be applied to 
a variety of other applications, such as governmental health surveillance after the pandemic 
ends. Using the data in other applications than originally intended is one example of a data 
privacy and security risk—the topic that I turn to next.  
C. A Discussion Regarding Data Privacy and Security Risks 
The amount of data being collected, used, stored, and disseminated in response to 
COVID-19 brings serious risks. This Section C describes several benefits and risks 
associated with health surveillance technologies that collect substantial amounts of PI and 
PHI. First, this section explains how the aggregation of large data sets is benefitting the 
response to COVID-19. Then, it presents the possible abuses of the data during and after 
the pandemic. Second, I describe the risk and consequences of a data breach. And third, I 
detail how the risks apply to the individual, and it balances the risks against the public 
health benefits in response to the pandemic.  
There is a trade off with the collection of PI and PHI in response to the pandemic—
balancing an individual’s right to data privacy against the public health need in combating 
COVID-19. With the clear public health interest, it is necessary to collect some level of PI 
and PHI to deploy the health technologies that will assist in slowing the spread, but the 
question becomes what is the optimal combination of COVID-19 response tactics that 
 
71 Amanda Yeo, The Secret Service Bought Phone Location Data, Dodging the Need for a Warrant, MASHABLE 
(Aug. 19, 2020), https://sea.mashable.com/tech/12013/the-secret-service-bought-phone-location-data-
dodging-the-need-for-a-warrant.   
72 Brenda Leong & Dr. Sara Jordan, Artificial Intelligence and the COVID-19 Pandemic, FUTURE OF PRIVACY 
F. (May 7, 2020), https://fpf.org/2020/05/07/artificial-intelligence-and-the-covid-19-pandemic/.  
73 Id. 
74 Id.  
75 See id.  
76 ML and AI require large data sets to train the technologies’ functionality. See LEONG, supra note 72 (quality 




53 HASTINGS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 12:1] 
 
   
 
allow for the suppression of the virus and disease but at a low human, civil, and economic 
cost?77  
The goal of collecting the PI and PHI during and after the pandemic is to eradicate the 
virus and disease.78 Stefan Pollinger, a researcher at Toulouse School of Economics in 
France, argues that the optimal combination of social distancing and case detection (e.g., 
contact tracing) allows for the suppression of COVID-19 at low additional human and 
economic costs (e.g., the costs associated with individuals’ privacy) if the proper balance 
is struck between social distancing and case detection—where social distancing decreases 
the growth rate of COVID-19 by reducing the contact between individuals and case 
detection isolates infectious individuals from the susceptible population.79 Social 
distancing is costly, and it becomes inefficient when the prevalence of COVID-19 is low.80 
When the prevalence is low, public health authorities can concentrate resources towards 
case detection, where the detection rate and efficiency of detection increase when the 
prevalence is low.81 Taken together, these complementary responses to COVID-19, when 
optimally balanced, curtail the cost of suppression.82 
In Pollinger’s optimal suppression theory, PI and PHI add value to both sides of the 
equation; the data can be used to track social distancing, and the data can be used in case 
detection—key benefits to the aggregation and mining of large data sets. For example, for 
social distancing tracking, location data from Apple’s navigation application, Maps, can 
be aggregated to track societal movement.83 Further, OpenTable data can track restaurant 
bookings.84 
 However, as Pollinger and other scholars note, the risks of collecting the PI and PHI 
are also present.85 While the purpose of collecting the PI and PHI may be for contact tracing 
and health monitoring, the data may be used after the pandemic ends for other purposes; 
this is known as mission creep or function creep.86 Function creep is when data is collected 
 
77 See generally Stefan Pollinger, COVID-19: Suppression Is Possible but at What Cost to Our Privacy?, 
WORLD ECON. F. (July. 8, 2020), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/07/suppressing-covid-19-with-a-
combination-of-social-distancing-and-case-detection/ (theorizing the eradication of COVID-19 is possible 
through a combination of contact tracing, case detection, and social distancing—all of which could have a low 
civil, human, and economic cost). 
78 See id. 
79 Id.  
80 Id. 
81 Id.  
82 Id.  
83 See Alex Harring & Nate Rattner, Here Are Five Charts Illustrating U.S. Economic Trends Amid the 
Coronavirus Pandemic, CNBC (July 19, 2020. 9:15 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/07/19/five-charts-
illustrating-us-economic-trends-amid-coronavirus.html (Compared to the baseline pre-pandemic average, the 
change in volume of navigation requests decreased by approximately 50% at the end of March into May 2020).  
84 Id. (OpenTable is a mobile application that allows users to make restaurant reservations. It reported a 100% 
decline in restaurant bookings via its mobile application at the end of March into May 2020).  
85 See generally Pollinger, supra note 77 (including privacy as an economic and health cost of the optimal 
suppression theory).  
86 See Dwork, supra note 19, at 1; See also Wendy Mariner, Mission Creep: Public Health Surveillance and 
Medical Privacy, 87 BOS. U. L. REV. 347 (2007) (discussing public health surveillance programs and mission 
creep in the health sphere); Evelina Manukyan & Joseph Guzzetta, How Function Creep May Cripple App-
Based Contact Tracing, INT’L ASS’N OF PRIVACY PROF’LS (May 27, 2020), https://iapp.org/news/a/how-
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for one purpose but is then used for other purposes, which often stray from the original 
intention.87  
For example, PI collected for a contact tracing application, when used for other 
purposes and combined with other data sets from a company’s data supply chain, can reveal 
social and political contacts.88 This data could reveal an individual’s daily routine, and with 
function creep, this data can be leveraged for marketing and advertising purposes or to 
compromise the individual’s safety and security. 
Several scholars and practitioners advocate for data minimization to prevent function 
creep.89 However, there are two issues with data minimization, especially with respect to 
collecting PI and PHI in response to the pandemic: (i) organizations are not incentivized to 
practice data minimization, and (ii) even if an organization practices data minimization 
with respect to collecting PI and PHI from the individual, the organization is still able to 
pair the data collected to its queried or autogenerated data. Organizations are not 
incentivized to minimize their data collection because most organizations monetize the 
data—a crucial part of their business models.90 
Several contact tracing applications state that they practice data minimization—going 
as far as claiming no PI is collected.91 Researchers from the University of California, Irvine 
(“UC Irvine”) proposed an application that “respects user privacy by not collecting location 
information or other personal data.”92 Their proposed application would use checkpoints 
in lieu of geolocation tracking—users would create new or join existing “checkpoints.”93 
To check-in, users scan a QR code.94 Users can voluntarily report a positive COVID-19 
diagnosis, and any user can check their “risk level” by reviewing their exposures to possible 
transmission routes.95  
Here, while the researchers at UC Irvine, in theory, created a contact tracing application 
that protects privacy via data minimization, the application is unrealistic because the 
application’s design will not generate the user adoption necessary for the application to be 
effective. The user experience (e.g., the use of QR codes) requires affirmative actions by 
the user, and the application’s core function relies on users taking these affirmative 
actions.96 Each action required by the user creates friction in the user experience, and each 
friction point increases the probability that a user will not complete the end goal (creating 
 
87 Manukyan, supra note 86.  
88 Dwork, supra note 19, at 1.  
89 See Jennifer Baker, Pandemic Incites Concerns About Data-Sharing Overreach, INT’L ASS’N OF PRIVACY 
PROF’LS (Mar. 26, 2020), https://iapp.org/news/a/global-pandemic-incites-concerns-about-data-sharing-
overreach/; Data minimization is when an organization or product only collects the data that the organization 
or product needs to collect and deletes any data that the organization may have collected but no longer needs.   
90 See id. (noting that Google may have altruistic reasons for collecting PI and PHI during the pandemic, but 
Google unequivocally leverages PI to generate revenue).  
91 See, e.g., Tyler Yasaka et al., Peer-to-Peer Contact Tracing: Development of a Privacy-Preserving 
Smartphone App, 8 JMIR MHEALTH UHEALTH (July 4, 2020), https://mhealth.jmir.org/2020/4/e18936.  
92 Id.  
93 Id.  
94 Id.  
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and checking into checkpoints by scanning QR codes).97 This is especially true today 
because frictionless or friction-minimal user experiences have become the norm.98 
A frictionless or friction-minimal user experience will require some level of PI and 
PHI collection, sharing, and usage.99 Because of this, several scholars and practitioners 
advocate for data anonymization.100 But as previously explained, even if “anonymous” or 
non-identifiable data is collected, such data cannot be truly anonymous because the data 
can be linked to individuals through “reidentification.”101 The data collector can source PI 
and PHI to “fill in the gaps,” and by doing so, it can link the data sets together to reconstruct 
the personal identity profile.102 
While an organization may rely on its data suppliers, there are other methods that an 
organization may pursue to collect PI and PHI that do not require a third-party supplier. 
The PI and PHI that an organization collects can be combined with data scraped off the 
internet.103 If Clearview AI, a startup that has collected over three billion photos of 
individuals by scraping the internet, can compile a massive database of PI via internet 
scraping, then any organization or malicious actor can do the same.104 Between scraping 
the internet and sourcing queried data, organizations can take the pandemic-related PI and 
PHI and capitalize on it in other ways. 
Considering the sources that an organization can leverage to gather data (collecting PI 
and PHI themselves, sourcing data from its supply chain, and scraping data), an 
organization can leverage other technologies, such as AI and ML, to use and mine the 
data—gathering insights, identifying monetization opportunities, exploiting psychology to 
influence individuals, etc. Dr. Dipayan Ghosn, the Pozen Fellow at the Shorenstein Center 
on Media, Politics and Public Policy at Harvard Kennedy School and former Policy 
Advisor in the Obama White House, notes, “the industry’s goal is to enter our mind and 
move our psychology,” and considering that AI and ML mature organically by learning 
 
97 See Victoria Young, Strategic UX: The Art of Reducing Friction, TELEPATHY (A SERVICENOW COMPANY), 
https://www.dtelepathy.com/blog/business/strategic-ux-the-art-of-reducing-friction (“friction is defined as 
interactions that inhibit people from intuitively and painlessly achieving their goals within the digital interface. 
Friction is a major problem because it leads to bouncing, reduces conversions, and frustrates would-be 
customers to the point of abandoning their tasks.”).   
98 Id.  
99 Friction-minimal user interface design is defined as creating a user experience that minimizes the friction 
points, which in turn, decreases bouncing, increases conversion rates, etc. 
100 See Liane Colonna, Privacy, Risk, Anonymization and Data Sharing in the Internet of Health Things, J. OF 
TECH. L. & POL’Y (2020), https://www.doi.org/10.5195/tlp.2020.235/ (assessing data anonymization as a risk 
mitigation strategy to reduce privacy concerns in the “Internet of Health Things”).  
101 See id.; See also Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of 
Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701 (2010).  
102 See supra Part I.B. 
103 Internet scraping is the process of creating a bot (software code) to pull or download information or data 
from websites; See, e.g., David Conrad, “Scraping” of a Publicly-Accessible Website Database May Be 
Misappropriation of Trade Secrets, JD SUPRA (July 14, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/scraping-
of-a-publicly-accessible-33549/ (explaining an Eleventh Circuit holding in a case that involved internet 
scraping). 
104 See Davey Alba, A.C.L.U. Accuses Clearview AI of Privacy ‘Nightmare Scenario’, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/28/technology/clearview-ai-privacy-lawsuit.html; See also Ben 
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from data sets, the influencing of one’s psychology is “an experimentally and empirically 
evolved animal (AI/ML) trained to identify opportunities for economic arbitrage.”105 
Despite the altruistic statements by organizations that have sought or are seeking to collect 
the PI and PHI during the pandemic, as Ghosh argues, “there is no incentive for 
[organizations] to delete the [PI] they have already accumulated [because data] 
contribute[s] to the high margins experienced across the sector.”106 
With the constant data collection and usage, often leveraging AI and ML, data is 
created every second.107 These massive databases of PI and PHI are subject to data 
breaches.108 And the healthcare industry is slowest at identifying or detecting a data breach 
after one occurred, which amplifies the risk.109 On average, the healthcare industry takes 
236 days to identify a breach and then 93 days to contain the breach.110  
Therefore, with respect to PI and PHI data collection, the risk for individuals is high, 
while the incentives for organizations are significantly lower. Organizations can collect PI 
and PHI and combine the data with other data sets obtained through its data supply chain 
or internet scraping. Then, they can leverage AI and ML to monetize the data and its 
insights, or they can psychologically influence individuals and the society. 
Notwithstanding the typical individualized risks associated with PI abuse, such as identity 
theft, the individualized risks with the COVID-19 pandemic are amplified.111 The 
unauthorized disclosure of a positive COVID-19 diagnosis, for example, can subject an 
individual to societal or familial avoidance or ostracization.112 
While individuals are more willing to share their PI and PHI given the COVID-19 
pandemic113, technologies, such as contact tracing applications and health monitoring 
platforms, can collect massive amounts of data. The data can be combined with data 
sourced from third party data suppliers and internet scraping.114 Considering this, the risks, 
such as function creep and data breaches, to individuals is not simply great but is amplified 
with respect to the pandemic. 
 
105 Dipayan Ghosh, Don’t Give Up on Your Digital Privacy Yet, SLATE (July 17, 2020), 
https://slate.com/technology/2020/07/data-privacy-surveillance-law-marketers.html.  
106 Id.  
107 Id.  
108 See IBM SEC. AND PONEMON INST., COST OF A DATA BREACH REPORT (2019) (the report considered the 
“typical activities” for the discovery of and the response to a data breach to determine the identification and 
response time. Seventeen industries were included in the study with a sample size of 507—13% of which are 
based in the United States followed by 9% in India and the United Kingdom. A total of 16 countries or regions 
were surveyed. For the survey’s methodology, see 67-73).  
109 See id. at 54. 
110 Id.  
111 See generally Müge Fazlioglu, Privacy Risks to Individuals in the Wake of COVID-19, INT’L ASS’N OF 
PRIVACY PROF’LS (June 2020), 
https://iapp.org/media/pdf/resource_center/privacy_risks_to_individuals_in_the_wake_of_covid19.pdf.  
112 See id. at 5; See also SARAH MASLIN NIR, They Beat the Virus. Now They Feel Like Outcasts, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 20, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/20/nyregion/coronavirus-victims-immunity.html (noting 
COVID-19 survivors in New York faced stigmatization).  
113 Ghose, supra note 16, at 26-27. 
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III. THE CURRENT LEGAL STANDARDS AND JURISPRUDENCE 
 
Having discussed the technologies and data ecosystem, this article turns to the current 
data privacy, security legal standards, and jurisprudence.  
Despite concerns regarding privacy and security in the internet age115, individuals may 
trust organizations to use best practices with respect to data privacy and security protocols 
and legal standards. Although, the willingness to share data during the pandemic 
increases116, the question is whether the current regime provides sufficient protections for 
individuals, which is critically important given the opportunity for organizations to exploit 
the willingness during the pandemic. 
Section A discusses the constitutional protections for individuals provided in the 
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and state constitutions. Also, Section 
A discusses statutory protections.117 Section B details the reasonable expectation of privacy 
standard—the standard frequently used for privacy protections—and it provides a new 
framework to evaluate privacy expectations and the reasonableness of those expectations. 
Lastly, Section C explores the shift in privacy expectations caused by the pandemic. 
 
A. Fourth Amendment, Statutory, and State Constitutional Protections 
 
Data privacy and security protections are primarily provided for in the Fourth 
Amendment and similar bodies of law.118 These sources of privacy protections are 
discussed below. 
The Fourth Amendment provides that individuals have a right to be secure “in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures . . ..”119 Its 
purpose is to “safeguard the privacy and security of individuals” against the arbitrary 
invasions by government officials.120 The Framers included the Fourth Amendment in 
response to the general warrants and writs of assistance of the colonial era that allowed the 
British to invade and search individuals’ homes in an unrestrained manner.121  
Over time, the Fourth Amendment’s search doctrine evolved from a trespass-centric 
doctrine focused on “constitutionally protected areas” to a person-centric doctrine that 
protects individuals when individuals seek to preserve their property as private.122 
 
115 See Brooke Auxier, How Americans See Digital Privacy Issues amid the COVID-19 Outbreak, PEW RSCH. 
CTR. (May 4, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/05/04/how-americans-see-digital-privacy-
issues-amid-the-covid-19-outbreak/ (finding the majority of Americans are concerned about data privacy and 
security, yet they do not understand current privacy laws and regulations). 
116 See generally Ghose, supra note 16, at 26-28. 
117 State statutory protections are out of scope for this article.  
118 Data privacy and security protections are also provided for in case law, state statutes, and federal and state 
regulations. These are out of scope for this article. The U.S. Constitution provides for privacy protections in 
other amendments (e.g., Third Amendment’s protection against the quartering of soldiers in one’s home, and 
the Fifth Amendment’s protection against self-incrimination), but these protections are out of scope because 
they do not apply to data privacy and security; See U.S. CONST. amends. III & V.  
119 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
120 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213 (emphasis added). 
121 Riley, 573 U.S. at 403. 
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Olmstead v. United States is one of the first cases that analyzed the distinction between the 
two views. The issue in Olmstead was whether wiretapping a private phone conversation 
was within the scope of the Fourth Amendment. Chief Justice Taft, writing for the majority, 
applied the trespass-centric interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.123 But in his dissent, 
Justice Louis Brandeis reasoned the Fourth Amendment to be widely applicable in 
protecting individuals’ personal privacy because “[t]ime works changes [and it] brings into 
existence new conditions and purposes” for such protections.124 In 1928, Justice Brandeis 
recognized that the Court must look beyond the literal meaning of the Fourth Amendment 
and adopt the person-centric interpretation because technological advancements in 
surveillance were inevitable.125  
Eventually, the Supreme Court adopted Justice Brandeis’s interpretation in Katz v. 
United States.126 In Katz, the Court provided that the Fourth Amendment protects people 
and not places.127 Justice Harlan’s concurrence introduced the reasonable expectation of 
privacy standard that is pervasive throughout privacy and security law today.128 
More recently, the Court recognized the sensitivity of data privacy in Carpenter v. 
United States. The Court provided that “when the Government tracks the location of a cell 
phone, it achieves near perfect surveillance, as if it had attached an ankle monitor to the 
phone’s user.”129 And in Riley v. California, at least with respect to the Fourth Amendment, 
“modern cell phones, as a category, implicate privacy concerns far beyond those implicated 
by the search of a cigarette pack, a wallet, or a purse.”130 In both cases, the Court set out 
how modern technologies have great consequences for privacy because the technology has 
the capability to capture every detail of an individual’s life.131 According to the Court, the 
capability to collect and store the mass amount of data leads to a reasonable expectation of 
privacy for the individual (i.e., data subject or user).132 Additionally, in United States v. 
Jones, Justice Sotomayor specifically noted the sensitivity of location data — stating that 
“GPS monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive record of a person’s public 
movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, 
religious, and sexual associations.”133 
 
123 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).  
124 Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (The majority held that wiretapping a private 
individual’s phone did not constitute a Fourth Amendment violation because the Fourth Amendment only 
extended to physical invasions of a person’s home or property. Justice Brandeis dissented and argued for a 
broad reading and application of the Fourth Amendment, which is widely adopted today. The majority’s 
opinion in Olmstead v. United States was overturned in Katz v. United States); See Anthony P. Picadio, Privacy 
in the Age of Surveillance: Technological Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment, 90 PA. B. ASS’N Q. 162, 
164-65 (2019). 
125 See Picadio, supra note 124, at 164. 
126 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).  
127 Id. at 351. 
128 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); See infra Part II.B (further explaining Justice Harlan’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy test).  
129 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218. 
130 Riley, 573 U.S. at 393. 
131 See Riley, 573 U.S. at 394; Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216-20. 
132 See, e.g., Riley, 573 U.S. at 393-98; Jones, 565 U.S. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring) (noting that individuals 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole of their physical movements).  
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However, the Fourth Amendment, as with the entire United States Constitution, limits 
the powers and authorities of the federal government and state governments; the Fourth 
Amendment limitations apply to the states according to the incorporation doctrine under 
the Fourteenth Amendment.134 Accordingly, the Fourth Amendment does not apply to 
private actors, but some state constitutions provide individuals privacy and security 
protections from both public and private actors.135 For example, Arizona’s constitution 
provides, “[n]o person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without 
authority of law.”136 Also, Hawaii’s constitution provides, “[t]he right of the people to 
privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed without a showing of a compelling state 
interest.”137  
In the absence of constitutional privacy and security protections, federal and state 
statutory protections may apply. For instance, at the federal level, HIPAA applies to PHI,138 
and at the state level, the California Consumer Privacy Act (“CCPA”) applies to all PI that 
any qualified business may collect from an individual.139  
HIPAA requires covered entities (e.g., health care providers) and their business 
associates to abide by data privacy, security, and breach notification requirements.140 
Several exceptions may apply to HIPAA’s protections. For instance, the following 
disclosures are permissible: (i) disclosures to public health authorities, (ii) disclosures to 
individuals who may have been exposed to a communicable disease or may otherwise be 
at risk of contracting or spreading a disease, and (iii) disclosures to prevent or lessen a 
serious and imminent threat to the health or safety of a person or the public.141  
 
134 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (fully incorporating the Fourth Amendment’s “unreasonable 
searches and seizures” freedom onto the states via the Fourteenth Amendment).  
135 See Privacy Protections in State Constitutions, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (May 11, 2020), 
https://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/privacy-protections-in-state-
constitutions.aspx (listing eleven states that provide explicit privacy protections in their state constitutions: 
Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Montana, New Hampshire, South Carolina, 
and Washington).  
136 ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 8.  
137 HAW. CONST. art. I, § 6 (emphasis added); see infra Part II.B (discussing the balancing test of an individual’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy against the state’s compelling interest).  
138 The Supreme Court has also recognized that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy of their 
PHI, which supports the general conception that HIPAA recognizes a reasonable expectation of privacy; See, 
e.g., Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001). 
139 See STEPHEN P. MULLIGAN ET AL., CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45631, DATA PROTECTION LAW: AN OVERVIEW 1-
23 (2019) (providing an overview of key statutory privacy and security protections, including HIPAA and 
CCPA).  
140 45 C.F.R. § 164 (HIPAA’s Security and Privacy Rules) (the Privacy Rule limits covered entities’ use and 
sharing of PHI with third parties without valid patient authorization, unless a HIPAA exception applies. The 
Security Rule requires covered entities to maintain administrative, physical, and technical safeguards to prevent 
threats or hazards to the security of electronic PHI. And per the data breach notification requirement, known 
as the Breach Notification Rule, covered entities must, upon the discovery of a data breach, notify affected 
individuals within sixty calendar days); the Data Breach Notification Rule defines a data breach as the 
“acquisition, access, use, or disclosure of [PHI] in a manner not permitted under [HIPAA] which compromises 
the security or privacy of the [PHI]”; a business associate is any entity that, on the behalf of a covered entity, 
creates, receives, maintains, or transmits PHI. 
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CCPA provides some of the most comprehensive data privacy and security protections 
at a state level in the United States.  To a prominent degree, the CCPA provides individuals 
with the following rights and protections: (i) the right to know what PI is collected, 
including how and why the PI is collected, (ii) the right to erase or delete one’s PI, (iii) the 
right to opt-out of the sale of one’s PI, and (iv) the right not to be discriminated against for 
exercising one’s rights and protections under the CCPA.142 While California is not alone 
in providing statutory privacy and security protections for individuals, the CCPA is 
recognized as one of the country’s strongest and most comprehensive regimes.143 
Between the Fourth Amendment, state constitutions, and federal and state statutory 
protections, individuals have a “patchwork” of privacy and security protections in the 
United States.144 But, none of the foregoing protections sufficiently and effectively protect 
PI and PHI with respect to the data collected and used in response to the pandemic. Thus, 
some state legislatures and Congress introduced legislation to protect individuals’ PI and 
PHI, but, at least with respect to Congress, no proposed bill has gained traction.145 
The common thread amongst the privacy and security protections is the reasonable 
expectation of privacy standard—whether the individual had an objectively reasonable 
expectation of privacy with respect to the PI or PHI that the individual is claiming to be 
private and secure. This standard is widely considered the foundational inquiry to any 
assessment of privacy protections.146 With constitutional protections, the reasonable 
 
142 CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1798.140(c-o) (CCPA defines PI as “information that identifies, relates to, describes, is 
capable of being associated with, or could reasonably be linked, directly or indirectly, with a particular 
consumer or household”); See Eric Goldman, An Introduction to the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), 
INT’L ASS’N OF PRIVACY PROF’LS 4-6 (July 9, 2018), 
https://iapp.org/media/pdf/resource_center/Intro_to_CCPA.pdf (CCPA lists specific rights and protections that 
are categorized in this article as these four categories. Other rights, protections, and obligations are provided 
for in the CCPA).   
143 See id.; Other states have different forms of data privacy and security protections. For instance, Illinois 
enacted the Biometric Information Privacy Act (“BIPA”) that protects individuals and their biometric data. 
BIPA continues to generate significant litigation against technology companies including Facebook, Amazon, 
and Microsoft; See ALAN S. WERNICK, Biometric Information – Permanent Personally Identifiable Information 
Risk, A.B.A. (Feb. 14, 2019), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/committee_newsletters/bcl/2019/201902/fa_
8/.    
144 Id. at 7 (noting that privacy protections for individuals come from a variety of laws that vary considerably 
in their purpose and scope rather than a single comprehensive law).  
145 See, e.g., Kansas Introduces the COVID-19 Contact Tracing Privacy Act, SEC. MAG. (June 9, 2020), 
https://www.securitymagazine.com/articles/92563-kansas-introduces-the-covid-19-contact-tracing-privacy-
act (a bill that aims to protect contact tracing data); See, e.g., Bobbie Johnson, The US’s Draft Law on Contact 
Tracing Apps Is a Step Behind Apple and Google, MIT TECH. REV. (June 2, 2020), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/06/02/1002491/us-covid-19-contact-tracing-privacy-law-apple-
google/ (describing The Exposure Notification Privacy Act, a bipartisan proposal that would prevent potential 
abuses by COVID-19 apps). Republican senators introduced the COVID-19 Consumer Data Protection Act 
that would implement protocols regarding the collection, use, and transfer of PI and PHI. Democratic senators 
introduced the Public Health Emergency Privacy Act that would effectively do the same as the Republicans’ 
proposal. But one difference between the two bills is that the Public Health Emergency Privacy Act would 
grant a private right of action.  
146 See generally Mark Taylor & James Wilson, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Disclosure of Health 
Data, MED. L. REV. (Apr. 25, 2019), https://www.doi.org/10.1093/medlaw/fez009 (while Taylor and Wilson’s 
article focuses on English law, the basis for privacy law in England is similar to the United States. Both regimes 
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expectation of privacy is found throughout Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. With 
statutory protections, the rights and protections are often, if not always, based on the 
reasonable expectation of privacy standard. For example, one has a reasonable expectation 
of privacy with respect to one’s PHI, and, accordingly, Congress enacted HIPAA to protect 
the privacy and security of PHI. Statutory protections also promote the reasonable 
expectation of privacy—individuals expect PHI to be protected because HIPAA exists 
today. Because privacy and security protections are based on and promote the reasonable 
expectation of privacy standard, I turn to a deeper explanation of this standard. 
 
B. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Standard 
 
The reasonable expectation of privacy standard comes from Justice Harlan’s 
concurrence in Katz v. United States.147 Regarding the Fourth Amendment, courts balance 
the individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy against any legitimate government 
interest.148 For PHI specifically, the Supreme Court recognized that individuals have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in their healthcare records, and, accordingly, the privacy 
expectation is generally reflected in HIPAA.149 Since Katz, the Supreme Court has not 
provided a coherent explanation to what makes a privacy expectation reasonable, and some 
scholars argue that the Fourth Amendment’s jurisprudence is illogical, erratic, and 
confusing.150 But more recently, other scholars identified common principles that thread 
throughout the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence—adding clarification to the Katz 
standard and providing a framework to apply in future matters.151 
To frame Section B, I first propose the Privacy Expectation Continuum (“Continuum”) 
that visually depicts where an individual’s privacy expectations may fall and whether such 
expectations are reasonable. Next, I explain the reasonable expectation of privacy standard 
developed by Justice Harlan in Katz. I describe several relevant Fourth Amendment 
doctrines that apply to the COVID-19 pandemic, and I explain various principles that give 
light to what forms a privacy expectation and how the expectation is reasonable or not. 
Lastly, I argue that the pandemic shifted the reasonable expectation of privacy with respect 
to PI and PHI. 
 
147 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
148 See Riley, 573 U.S. at 385 (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)).  
149 See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 67.  
150 See Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503, 504 (2007); See 
also Matthew Tokson, The Emerging Principles of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 88 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 2-3 
(2020) (hereinafter “TOKSON’S PRINCIPLES”). 
151 See TOKSON’S PRINCIPLES, supra note 150, at 4 (detailing three principles of the Supreme Court’s Fourth 
Amendment decisions: (i) the intimacy of the place or thing targeted, (ii) the amount of information sought, 
and (iii) the cost of the investigation); See also Matthew Tokson, Knowledge and Fourth Amendment Privacy, 
111 NW. U. L. REV. 139 (2016) (hereinafter “Tokson, Knowledge”); See, e.g., Weiyin Hong, Drivers and 
Inhibitors of Internet Privacy Concern: A Multidimensional Development Theory Perspective, J. OF BUS. 
ETHICS (June 11, 2019), https://www.doi.org/10.1007/s10551-019-04237-1 (testing the Multidimensional 
Development Theory (“MDT”) to the antecedents of internet privacy concern. MDT suggests that an 
individual’s privacy concern is jointly determined by four factors: (i) environmental, (ii) individual, (iii) 
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Privacy expectations fall on a continuum (Figure 3). I segment the continuum into 
quadrants where Quadrant I is no expectation of privacy, II is low expectation of privacy, 
III is high expectation of privacy, and IV is an expectation of complete privacy. Each 
quadrant is marked with certain characteristics. For example, if an individual has no 
privacy expectations (Quadrant I), then the individual has no control over the collection, 
disclosure, storage, or usage of her information. Information in Quadrant II is minimally 
controlled—the individual maintains some privacy expectations, but, otherwise, she 
willingly discloses the information (e.g., email address). For Quadrant III, the individual 
controls the information but recognizes the information must be disclosed in a limited 
capacity in certain situations (e.g., social security number). Finally, for Quadrant IV, the 
individual expects complete privacy, full control over the information, and strictly limited 
disclosure or use of the information (e.g., sexual history).  
For any information at issue, I consider two points on the Continuum—the objective 
point and the subjective point. Individuals may place specific categories of information 
into different quadrants (e.g., sexual history may fall into Quadrant II or III for some 
individuals) according to their subjective privacy expectations. The reasonable person 
standard determines the objective point. Considering this Continuum, I turn to an 
explanation of the reasonable expectation of privacy standard before discussing how 
reasonableness, the objective point, is determined. 
 




In Katz, Justice Harlan stated that a Fourth Amendment violation occurs when the 
person who has “exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy . . . that society is 
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”152 The Supreme Court eventually adopted and 
condensed Justice Harlan’s Katz standard—deciding that a search is unreasonable when 
the government violates an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy.153 The Court 
has inconsistently applied and explained the reasonable expectation of privacy standard in 
the cases since Katz.154 
Despite its inconsistencies, the Court has established several doctrines that it applies 
with some regularity. First, the third-party doctrine provides that an individual has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy with her information that she turns over or exposes to 
third parties.155 For instance, an individual cannot reasonably expect her call log to be 
 
152 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).  
153 See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (holding that a person is to be free from unreasonable 
government intrusion whenever an individual harbors a reasonable expectation of privacy).  
154 See TOKSON’S PRINCIPLES, supra note 150, at 7-8. 
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private because the service provider sees this information.156 Here, the third-party doctrine 
categorically places information turned over to third parties into Quadrant I despite an 
individual personally believing her information falls into a higher quadrant.  
While the third-party doctrine is still considered good law today, Justice Sotomayor 
and many legal scholars advocate for the Court to revisit the doctrine because the doctrine 
is “ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of information about 
themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.”157 
However, the Court has retreated from a broad application of the third-party 
doctrine.158 In United States v. Miller, the Court broadly applied the third-party doctrine in 
holding that the individual does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect 
to PI held by third parties when the information is limited in scope and intrusion159 But 
unlike Miller, in Carpenter, the Court stopped short of broadly applying the third-party 
doctrine to PI that can reveal highly private personal affairs.160 Unlike in Miller, where 
bank records reveal a limited scope of personal information, in Carpenter, cell phone 
geolocation data reveals highly personal information such as political affiliations, 
socialization habits, frequently visited locations, etc.161 Carpenter’s limit on the third-party 
doctrine turned on the scope of the information and level of intrusion. 
The level of intrusion or invasion is the second general “principle” that the Court 
regularly applies.162 The general rule is that the more intrusive or invasive the action (i.e., 
search) taken, the more likely the action would infringe on the individual’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy.163 The information at issue in Miller were bank records—the Court 
held that bank records could only reveal some personal information.164 However, in 
Carpenter, the information at issue—the cell phone geolocation data—revealed 
significantly more personal information.165 In other words, the data in Carpenter was more 
intrusive than the data in Miller. 
The third relevant doctrine addresses technologically enhanced searches. In Kyllo v. 
United States, law enforcement used a heat detection device to penetrate the walls of a 
 
156 See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-43 (1976).  
157 Jones, 565 U.S. at 416-17 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (stating “it may be necessary to reconsider the premise 
that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties 
[because] [t]his approach is ill suited to the digital age . . . .”).  
158 See, e.g., Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2206 (holding that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
with respect to cell phone geolocation tracking data because this data can reveal a great deal of PI). 
159 See generally Miller, 435 U.S. at 440-43 (holding that an individual does not maintain a reasonable 
expectation of privacy with respect to bank records). 
160 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2206. 
161 Jones, 565 U.S. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (geolocation data may reveal “familial, political, 
professional, religious, and sexual associations.”); See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217-18 (the Court declined to 
extend the third party doctrine because “[g]iven the unique nature of cell phone location records . . . when the 
Government tracks the location of a cell phone it achieves near perfect surveillance . . . .”). 
162 See, e.g., Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016) (holding that a warrantless breath test of an 
intoxicated individual is reasonable, but a warrantless blood draw is an unreasonable search because blood 
draws are significantly more intrusive); some scholars may not consider the level of intrusiveness as a 
doctrine—hence, for this article, it is considered a general “principle” in the Court’s jurisprudence.  
163 See, e.g., id.; Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (holding that a blood sample to test one’s blood 
alcohol content is a search within the Fourth Amendment). 
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home to “see” inside.166 While the device did not physically intrude into the individual’s 
home, the technology enabled the law enforcement’s..167 Here, Kyllo would fall into 
Quadrant III.  
The fourth relevant doctrine is the common law trespass doctrine, which came before 
Justice Harlan’s reasonable expectation of privacy standard.168 In short, an individual 
maintains a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to her property. Historically, 
the Court applied the Fourth Amendment’s protection and a person’s expectation of 
privacy to physical property (e.g., an individual’s home).169 But today, an individual’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy applies to the person, not just the person’s property.170  
In Jones, the Government attached a GPS monitoring device to Jones’ automobile, and 
the Court held, “[t]he Government usurped Jones’ property [and property interest in Jones’ 
automobile] for the purpose of conducting surveillance on him . . . .”171 However, if Jones 
consented to the GPS tracking, then Jones would not have had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.172 Justice Alito concurred in Jones, but he recognized the common-law trespass 
doctrine and the reasonable expectation of privacy standard may be ineffective or 
unworkable given the development and advancement of new technologies; electronic 
surveillance does not physically intrude on a person’s property and individuals may relax 
their expectations of privacy as a tradeoff with the convenience that new technologies 
provide.173  
Now, the question becomes how the Court determines the reasonableness of an 
expectation of privacy (i.e., the objective point on the Continuum). Legal and constitutional 
scholars recently identified certain principles and frameworks that the Court typically 
applies to privacy claims.  
 An analysis of the more than forty Fourth Amendment cases from the Supreme 
Court shows three emerging principles, for which the interaction between these principles 
 
166 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).  
167 Id. at 33-34 (“We think that obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the interior 
of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally 
protected area,’ . . . constitutes a search” within the terms of the Fourth Amendment); PICADIO, supra note 124, 
at 167. 
168 Jones, 565 U.S. at 409 (“the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not substituted 
for, the common-law trespassory test.”).  
169 See, e.g., Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 438 (holding that the Fourth Amendment was not applicable because, while 
the Government wiretapped a phone, there was no physical entry into the home); Olmstead was later overturned 
as the Supreme Court evolved the Fourth Amendment’s protections from a property-centric approach to a 
person-centric approach. 
170 See, e.g., Katz, 389 U.S. at 351; See supra Part II.C and note 123 and accompanying text; Alderman v. 
United States, 394 U.S. 165, 176 (stating that the Supreme Court did not move away from the property-centric 
approach to the Fourth Amendment protections, but rather, the Court extended the protections to the person 
and their private conversations).  
171 Jones, 565 U.S. at 413 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
172 See id. at 409 (“the specific question [in Knotts] was whether the installation [of a tracking beeper] ‘with 
the consent of the original owner’ constitute[d] a search or seizure . . . [w]e held not.” (quoting United States 
v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 707 (1984)).  
173 Id. at 426-27 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[T]he Court’s reliance on the law of trespass will present particularly 
vexing problems in cases involving surveillance [because it] has traditionally required a physical touching of 
property. . . New technology may provide increased convenience or security at the expense of privacy, and 




65 HASTINGS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 12:1] 
 
   
 
is key: (i) the intimacy of the place or thing targeted by the government (the “Intimacy 
Principle”), (ii) the amount of information sought (the “Amount Principle”), and (iii) the 
cost of the investigation (the “Cost Principle”).174  
Regarding the Intimacy Principle, if the information sought is highly personal or 
sensitive in nature, then the surveillance is more likely to infringe on an individual’s 
privacy expectations.175 Like in Carpenter, where the Court determined the individual had 
a reasonable expectation of privacy, the cell phone data was intimate because it revealed a 
broad picture of the individual’s life—aligning with the intrusiveness principle.176 Here, 
Carpenter maintained a higher subjective point on the Continuum, and the Court agreed 
that the objective point aligned with Carpenter’s privacy expectations.  
For the Amount Principle, the more extensive and longer in duration, the more likely 
the surveillance will infringe on an individual’s privacy expectations.177 For example, the 
Court determined that long-term monitoring of an individual’s automobile using a GPS 
tracker infringed on the individual’s privacy expectations.178 And in Carpenter, the Court 
stressed its concern regarding the dangers of collecting voluminous amounts of data.179 
With respect to the Cost Principle, if the government can gather large amounts of data 
at a relatively low cost, the surveillance is more likely to infringe on an individual’s privacy 
expectations.180 In Jones, Justice Alito noted that low-cost surveillance techniques, which 
are more prevalent given technological advancements, have eroded structural barriers that, 
historically, made government surveillance difficult and costly.181 For instance, in 
Carpenter, the cell phone data provided the government with intimate PI with little to no 
effort and cost—the government simply asked the cell phone service provider for the 
records.182 
 Carpenter provides the best example of the three principles and how these 
principles interact. The government sought cell phone records that revealed detailed 
location data over a long period of time (Intimacy Principle).183 These records were 
voluminous (Amount Principle).184 And obtaining these records was of little to no cost to 
the government (Cost Principle).185 While the Court does not explicitly frame its analysis 
using these principles, in Carpenter and other cases, the Court applies or considers these 
principles when analyzing the issue. These principles aid the Court in determining the 
objective point on the Continuum.  
 
174 TOKSON’S PRINCIPLES, supra note 150, at 13 (Tokson does not name the three principles. I name the 
principles for this article).  
175 Id. at 15 (“The more intimate the place or thing targeted by the police for investigation, the more likely such 
investigation is to infringe the privacy of the affected person or persons.”).  
176 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217-18; supra note 161 and accompanying text. 
177 TOKSON’S PRINCIPLES, supra note 150, at 18. 
178 Jones, 565 U.S. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[T]he use of longer term GPS monitoring in investigations 
of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy.”). 
179 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217-18; TOKSON’S PRINCIPLES, supra note 150, at 19 (“[The Court] repeatedly 
emphasized the dangers that such a volume of data posed to a citizen’s privacy . . . .”).  
180 TOKSON’S PRINCIPLES, supra note 150, at 23. 
181 Jones, 565 U.S. at 429 (Alito, J., concurring); TOKSON’S PRINCIPLES, supra note 150, at 24. 
182 See TOKSON’S PRINCIPLES, supra note 150, at 25. 
183 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2212.  
184 Id. at 2209.  
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 But as Justice Alito recognized in Jones, technological advancements may erode 
individuals’ reasonable expectations of privacy.186 And while an on-point case has not 
come before the Court, advancements in technologies may erode the privacy expectations 
even if the facts are similar to Carpenter (i.e., intimate PI collected at mass volumes at a 
relatively low cost). Why? Because an individual’s privacy expectations are a function of 
what the individual knows and experiences.187 This “formula” can be shown as follows, 
where EoP is the expectation of privacy, K is knowledge, and E is experience (“EoP 
Formula”): 
 
𝑬𝒐𝑷 =  𝒇(𝑲 + 𝑬) 
 
For example, in United States v. Forrester, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
determined that the individual knowingly exposed PI (his IP address) when the individual 
visited a website.188 More specifically, the court concluded that individuals “should know 
that this information is . . . provided to [i]nternet service providers.”189 Here, the Court 
considered knowledge (Forrester knew he disclosed the information) and experience 
(individuals should know information is shared with internet service providers given their 
experiences with websites).  
 The EoP Formula holds true when there is a lack of knowledge or a different set 
of experiences. In a situation like Carpenter, it is not common knowledge for someone to 
know the intimacy of the data collected in her cell phone records.190 With cell phone data, 
courts have held that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy because it is unlikely that 
most people (i) know or should know the amounts of intimate data collected by cell phone 
providers, and (ii) do not have sufficient personal experiences (e.g., working for a cell 
phone service provider) to have such knowledge.191 
 Even if an individual holds a reasonable expectation of privacy, the individual’s 
privacy expectations may be set aside if the government’s interest is sufficiently 
compelling. Under the special needs doctrine, the government can demonstrate a “special 
need” to justify a search where the individual has a reasonable privacy expectation.192 For 
example, the Supreme Court upheld suspicionless drug tests as a condition of 
 
186 See Jones, 565 U.S. at 429; TOKSON’S PRINCIPLES, supra note 150, at 23.  
187 Tokson, Knowledge, supra note 151, at 149. 
188 United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2007); Tokson, Knowledge, supra note 151, at 150. 
189 Forrester, 512 F.3d at 510 (9th Cir. 2007).  
190 See Tokson, Knowledge, supra note 151, at 158-64 (explaining cell phone location information [or CSLI, 
the same data at issue in Carpenter], a Third Circuit Court of Appeals decision held that it is unlikely that 
individuals know cell phones and cell phone providers collect and store massive amounts of intimate data). 
191 See generally id. 
192 See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 663-65 (1995) (finding it lawful to drug test 
student athletes where there was some evidence of athletes using marijuana because student athletes can be 
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employment193 or for participation in public school activities.194 And in Skinner v. Railway 
Labor Executives Ass’n, the Court upheld the drug testing program of railroad employees 
because the government had a “special need” in identifying impaired performance that 
could injure the passengers or the public.195 In short, the government’s role in protecting 
public health and safety may be a sufficient justification for a suspicionless search under 
the special needs doctrine, as the Court showed in Skinner.  
From an economic rationale, the government’s interest in protecting public health and 
safety may rest in the value of a human life, among other reasons. National Public Radio’s 
Planet Money podcast explained the general rule that any federal safety regulation must 
pass a cost-benefit test—if the costs of the regulation (e.g., money) exceed the benefits 
(e.g., lives saved), the regulation is rejected.196 Historically, economists considered the cost 
of death in the cost-benefit analysis.197 But today, economists consider the cost of death 
plus the cost that individuals place on themselves for the value of their lives.198 Kip Viscusi, 
a risk and uncertainty economist at Vanderbilt University, calculates the value of a 
“statistical life” today to be $10 million.199  
For perspective, Viscusi calculated the cost-benefit of shutting down the economy in 
order to slow the spread of COVID-19; he assumed one million lives were saved from the 
economic shutdowns,200 multiplied by the $10 million per statistical live, and he arrived at 
$10 trillion as the “benefit” in the cost-benefit analysis.201 And considering $10 trillion is 
approximately half of the United States GDP, this “benefit” estimate means that “in order 
to justify completely opening businesses back up, the economy would need to lose half of 
its value—" the basic and conservative calculation results in an extremely high cost if there 
was not a shutdown.202 
  Here, with respect to COVID-19, the government’s compelling interest is saving 
lives and protecting public health. Viscusi placed a dollar figure on how much the 
government’s interest is in protecting the public health—it would cost $10 million in 
 
193 See, e.g., Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 769 (1989) (holding that the government 
had a sufficient “special need” when requiring applicants to take a drug test for federal employment positions); 
See also Wendy Mariner, Reconsidering Constitutional Protection for Health Information Privacy, 18 U. PA. 
J. CONST. L. 975, 1022-23 (describing the special needs doctrine). 
194 See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. V. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 836-37 
(2002) (holding that the school district had a sufficient “special need” in requiring students participating in 
extracurricular activities to take a drug test); see also Mariner, supra note 193, at 1022-23. 
195 Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 633 (1989).  
196 Planet Money, Lives vs. The Economy, NAT’L PUB. RADIO, at 04:35 (Apr. 15, 2020), 
https://one.npr.org/?sharedMediaId=835571843:858418568.  
197 Id. at 05:13. 
198 Id. at 10:12-12:05 (“[P]eople are putting a dollar value on their own lives all the time based on the jobs that 
they do. How risky they are, and how much money they’re willing to accept, in wages, for those risky jobs.”). 
199 Id. at 21:31 (Viscusi’s cost model takes the average cost across the entire labor market, considering factors 
such as the likelihood of death on the job and how much extra money workers demand for that risk of death).  
200 Id. at 22:00 (Viscusi used the one-million-lives-saved assumption because (i) President Donald Trump 
publicly stated that one million lives were saved, and (ii) epidemiologists stated that it could be as high as two 
million lives saved. Viscusi chose the conservative estimate).  
201 Id. at 22:09 (the “benefit” is saving $10 trillion in the value of lives where the “cost” in the cost-benefit 
analysis is the economic impact (e.g., the economic contraction) of the shutdowns). 
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economic value for each life lost.203 Applying this figure to the privacy discussion, this 
means that while individuals may have a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to 
their PI and PHI, even during the pandemic, the government’s compelling interest (here, 
demonstrated by the economics of “the value of life”) override or set aside privacy 
protections. Further, given this compelling interest, individuals are more willing to share 
their PI and PHI in the interest of public health.204 This marks a shift in privacy expectations 
and the reasonableness of those expectations, which I turn to next. 
 
C. The Shift in the Privacy Expectations and Reasonableness 
 
Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, PHI was generally considered private and protected, 
and for the most part, PHI still is.205 However, in only a few months’ time, the pandemic 
shifted privacy expectations of PHI, and by doing so, the reasonableness of privacy 
expectations. This Section C describes (i) the shift in privacy expectations, and (ii) the 
newfound reasonable expectation of disclosure during the pandemic. For this section, this 
article presumes that (i) the more sensitive a category of information is considered, the 
more likely individuals desire to keep that category of information private, and (ii) the more 
willing individuals are to share information, the less private individuals consider that 
information to be. 
 Americans consistently and reliably considered their health data as one of the most 
sensitive categories of data.206 Respondents to a 2014 survey rated health data as the second 
highest category of information (the first being their social security numbers) with respect 
to the privacy and sensitivity of the data.207 More than half of adults considered their health 
data to be “very sensitive” in nature.208 Moreover, most adults consider their health data to 
be just as sensitive as the content of their private phone conversations.209 Per these survey 
responses, health data falls into Quadrants III or IV on the Continuum, depending on the 
data’s specifics. 
 Similar levels of sensitivity apply to other types of information. Half of adults 
consider their geolocation data to be very sensitive.210 And approximately 25% of adults 
 
203 See supra note 201 and accompanying text. 
204 Ghose, supra note 16, at 28. 
205 See discussion supra Part II.A. 
206 See Mary Madden, Public Perceptions of Privacy and Security in the Post-Snowden Era, PEW RSCH. CTR. 
(Nov. 12, 2014), https://www.pewresearch.org/wp-
content/uploads/sites/9/2014/11/PI_PublicPerceptionsofPrivacy_111214.pdf (the survey was conducted 
between January 10-27, 2014, with a sample size of 607 adults, all of whom were 18 years of age or older. A 
total of 1,537 panelists were invited to respond, of which 935 responded, and 607 agreed to join the survey 
panel. Four separate surveys regarding the “current issues, some of which relate to technology.” The sampling 
error is ±4.6% at a 95% level of confidence); See also Gallup Org., Public Attitudes Toward Medical Privacy, 
INST. FOR HEALTH FREEDOM (Sept. 2000) (detailing a survey from 2000 that shows similar levels of concern 
regarding the privacy of health data. The survey is presented here to show that privacy concerns regarding 
health data has remained relatively constant over time).  
207 Id. at 7 (I use the term “healthcare data” for this article, but Pew Research Center described this type of 
information as “state of your health and the medications you take” in the survey). 
208 Id. at 32. 
209 Id. at 33. 
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consider their search history, religious views, political views, and who their friends are to 
be considered very sensitive, while 8% of adults consider their purchasing habits very 
sensitive.211  
The COVID-19 pandemic shifted the willingness of individuals to share these sensitive 
categories of information. As of April 2020, 84% of adults said that they would be more 
willing to share their health data to combat the spread of COVID-19, and 58% of adults 
said that they would be willing to share their geolocation data.212 Furthermore, 
approximately two-thirds of adults stated that they would be willing to install an app on 
their devices to help slow the spread of the pandemic, even if the app collected geolocation 
and health data.213 
In comparing the pre- and during-pandemic surveys, there is a shift in the willingness 
to share data and information, which suggests individuals have lowered their sensitivity to 
sharing their health data.214 This may be attributable to several factors, for which, 
unfortunately, little to no data exists to confirm or invalidate.215 These factors could include 
an individual’s self-interest in mitigating the effects of the pandemic (e.g., reopening 
businesses), a sense of “doing their part” in combating the pandemic, a recognition of the 
benefits in sharing the data, or a recognition of the level of risk associated with sharing the 
data.216 
Here, the pandemic shifted both the objective and subjective points on the Continuum. 
The pre-pandemic survey responses suggest individuals would place their health data into 
Quadrants III or IV (the subjective point). Recognizing a shift in privacy expectations has 
occurred, to provide a possible explanation as to why this shift occurred, I turn back to the 
three principles and the formula to determine the reasonableness of privacy expectations 
(objective point).217  
First, the Intimacy Principle remains constant for the health and geolocation data—
nothing changed regarding how intimate the data sets are for individuals prior to the 
pandemic versus during the pandemic.218  
Second, for the Amount Principle, this article assumes that the amount of health data 
remains constant.219  
 
211 Supra note 206, at 37. 
212 Ghose, supra note 16, at 3. 
213 Id. 
214 It is difficult to determine whether the shift in willingness to share PHI is permanent because no post-
pandemic data exists. As of November 2020, the pandemic is ongoing. 
215 See supra note 214 and accompanying text. 
216 These factors are speculative and non-exhaustive. Some factors may be temporary (i.e., only last during the 
pandemic and may reverse an individual’s willingness to share their PHI post-pandemic) or permanent (i.e., 
continuing post-pandemic and have permanently changed an individual’s willingness to share their PHI). An 
example of a temporary factor is the “doing their part” in combating the pandemic (once the pandemic ends, 
there no need for an individual to “do their part” in combating the virus). A permanent factor could be the 
recognition of the level of risk (an individual considering the sensitivity of her PHI is lower because she sees 
more benefit than risk associated with sharing the data post-pandemic; the trade-off calculation changed).  
217 See discussion supra Part II.B and note 151. 
218 See id. 
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Third, the Cost Principle may explain the shift.220 Here, the Cost Principle extends 
beyond a monetary cost. The tradeoff calculation for individuals changed—a majority of 
adults believe that preventing the spread of COVID-19 (benefit) is more important than 
protecting people’s privacy with respect to their PHI (cost).221 In other words, individuals 
see the increased benefit or reduced risk in sharing the data under a traditional cost-benefit 
analysis. However, this calculation changes if the data is released publicly—during-
pandemic survey data shows that 61% of adults are uncomfortable with public disclosure 
of their PHI.222 This suggests there is still some expectation of privacy as individuals are 
still uncomfortable with public disclosure, but a shift in those privacy expectations 
occurred because most individuals rate the pandemic response as more important than 
protecting people’s privacy. In other words, the objective point—what is reasonable to 
society—has not shifted entirely to the left of the Continuum (no expectation of privacy). 
If an individual were to claim the pre-pandemic privacy expectation with respect to her 
health and geolocation data, it would likely be unreasonable because this shift occurred—
society, or at least a portion thereof, now believes disclosure of PHI to combat COVID-19 
is beneficial. 
Applying the EoP Formula, both knowledge and experience changed because of the 
pandemic.223 Here, the individual’s personal knowledge changed; individuals know, or 
should know, that geolocation data can and will likely be used for contact tracing purposes. 
With the public attention COVID-19 has generated, society better understands what contact 
tracing is, its value to combating the spread of COVID-19, and what data contact tracing 
requires.224 And individuals have had experiences in combating the virus (e.g., wearing 
masks, social distancing, etc.) and feeling the pandemic’s global impact (e.g., air travel 
changes and interruptions, economic contractions, etc.). These changes—in individual 
knowledge and experiences—provide an explanation for the change in individuals’ privacy 
expectations; more individuals are willing to share their PHI given the pandemic.225 
 
220 See id. 
221 Grant Buckles, Americans Rank Halting COVID-19 Spread Over Medical Privacy, GALLUP (May 15, 2020), 
https://news.gallup.com/poll/311015/americans-rank-halting-covid-spread-medical-privacy.aspx (of those 
surveyed, 39% responded that they would prioritize protecting people’s medical privacy over preventing the 
spread of COVID-19, and 61% answered that they would prioritize the latter over the former).  
222 Lucy Simko, et al., COVID-19 Contact Tracing and Privacy: Studying Opinion and Preferences 10, (May 
8, 
2020) (Univ. of Wash., Working Paper), https://seclab.cs.washington.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2020/05/contact-tracing-user-privacy.pdf. 
223 See supra Part II.B and note 187. 
224 See, e.g., ED. BD., America Could Control the Pandemic by October. Let’s Get to It., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8, 
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/08/opinion/sunday/coronavirus-response-testing-lockdown.html; 
Benjamin Lesser, et al., Local Governments ‘Overwhelmed’ in Race to Trace U.S. COVID Contacts, REUTERS 
(Aug. 4, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/health-coronavirus-tracing/; BUCKLES, 
supra note 221; Chas Kissick, et al., What Ever Happened to Digital Contact Tracing?, LAWFARE (July 21, 
2020), https://www.lawfareblog.com/what-ever-happened-digital-contact-tracing. 
225 See Buckles, supra note 221 and accompanying text; See also Jennifer Steinhauer & Abby Goodnough, 
Contact Tracing Is Failing in Many States. Here’s Why., N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/31/health/covid-contact-tracing-tests.html (contact tracing applications 
have not been successfully deployed. The several factors that may explain why the United States has not 
successfully deployed contact tracing include (i) the number of people, (ii) the delay in getting test results back, 




71 HASTINGS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 12:1] 
 
   
 
 Given this change in the privacy expectations of PHI, in certain situations, 
individuals may have a reasonable expectation of disclosure.226 In certain situations, 
individuals expect the disclosure of their PHI. Two situations where individuals are likely 
to have a reasonable expectation of disclosure are: (i) for public health and safety purposes, 
and (ii) for customer experience purposes associated with modern technology. Individuals 
may expect their PHI data to be transmitted to public health authorities, contact tracing 
applications, and the like for the reasons previously described.227 Further, individuals may 
expect the sharing of their PHI between organizations because modern technology (e.g., 
user interface and experience design) have set expectations regarding the use, functionality, 
and convenience of technology.228 For instance, individuals get frustrated if they must 
answer the same medical-related questions repeatedly—they expect the PHI to be shared 
to avoid the tedious repetition or friction in the customer experience.229 
Justice Harlan’s reasonable expectation of privacy standard is the basis for privacy 
law—under both the Fourth Amendment and statutory protections, such as HIPAA.230 
While not explicitly described by the Supreme Court, the Court considers several principles 
that are generally used to establish whether a claimed infringement of an individual’s 
privacy expectations is reasonable.231 While individuals and society reasonably expect their 
PI and PHI to be private, the COVID-19 pandemic shifted those privacy expectations.232 
To illustrate this shift, I turn to a case study in Part III. 
IV. A CASE STUDY: THE PANDEMIC’S EFFECT ON THE LAW 
 
Organizations that bring together large numbers of individuals (e.g., employers, 
universities, etc.), in efforts to return to some level of normalcy and to protect individuals 
whom they are responsible for, have implemented or are implementing various programs 
and initiatives using health surveillance technology.233 For example, Ernst & Young and 
the International Association of Privacy Professionals surveyed organizations to better 
understand the pandemic’s impact and how organizations are responding to it from a 
 
226 See generally Taylor, supra note 146, at 453. 
227 See supra Part II.B (Intimacy, Amount, and Cost Principles and the EoP Formula). 
228 See generally Taylor, supra note 146, at 453. 
229 Id. 
230 See supra Part II.A. 
231 See supra Part II.B. 
232 See supra Part II.C. 
233 See, e.g., TRUSTARC PRIVACY INTELLIGENCE, Managing Employee Privacy in the Face of COVID-19, 
TRUSTARC (Mar. 19, 2020), https://trustarc.com/blog/2020/03/19/managing-employee-privacy-in-the-face-of-
covid-19/ (describing inquiries it received regarding employee privacy matters); Philip Gordan, et al., 
Frequently Asked Questions on Workplace Privacy and COVID-19, LITTLER MENDELSON P.C. (Mar. 31, 2020), 
https://www.littler.com/publication-press/publication/frequently-asked-questions-workplace-privacy-and-
covid-19 (discussing legal issues regarding PHI and employee privacy); Jenn Abelson, et al., At College Health 
Centers, Students Battle Misdiagnoses and Inaccessible Care, WASH. POST (July 13, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/2020/07/13/college-health-centers-problems/?arc404=true 
(describing efforts that universities took or are taking); Letter from Doug McMillon, et al., Chairman, Bus. 
Roundtable, to Vice President Michael R. Pence (Apr. 24, 2020), https://s3.amazonaws.com/brt.org/Business-
Roundtable-GuidelinesforReturningtoWork-2020.04.24.pdf (a letter from Fortune 500 chief executives 
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privacy and security perspective.234 Over 50% of employers have collected some level of 
PHI from their employees about symptoms, and 60% of organizations identified that they 
are keeping records of employee diagnosed with COVID-19.235 Universities have been and 
are at the forefront of the response—implementing health and safety initiatives for their 
students, employees, and visitors.236  
To better illustrate the shift in the privacy expectations with respect to PI and PHI, and 
the reasonableness of those expectations, this Part III details the efforts by Arizona State 
University (“ASU”) as a case study. I select ASU as a case study because (i) it is a public 
institution that (ii) has three primary constituent groups—students, staff and faculty, and 
visitors—each presenting a unique set of challenges. Part III is not intended to be an 
exhaustive analysis of the legal or constitutional issues related to ASU’s initiatives or the 
initiatives of other universities. Rather, Part III synthesizes the information presented in 
Parts I and II regarding the technologies and the legal standards to present a better 
understanding of how the rapidly emerging health surveillance technologies, traditional 
jurisprudence, and legal standards interplay.  
This Part III considers ASU’s contact tracing, case management, and health monitoring 
platforms. I describe the technology ASU deployed, discuss the possible data supply chain 
design, evaluate the data privacy and security risks, and apply the current legal standards 
and jurisprudence.  
Before the pandemic, ASU deployed and utilized an electronic health record system 
and practice management system (“HRS/PMS”) from Point and Click Solutions, Inc. 
(“PointNClick”) for its university-wide campus health services.237 At the start of the 
pandemic, PointNClick added new features and capabilities to its platform to enable its 
customers to respond to the global health emergency.238 For example, PointNClick added 
a contact tracing feature that, if a student tests positive for COVID-19, the HRS/PMS will 
automatically place the person in a contact tracing queue that will enable the university to 
take additional actions to prevent an outbreak.239 
For staff and faculty case management and contact tracing, ASU deployed 
Salesforce.com’s Work.com solution (“Work”).240 Work’s contact tracing capability 
 
234 See Müge Fazlioglu, Privacy in the Wake of COVID-19: Remote Work, Employee Health Monitoring and 
Data Sharing, ERNST & YOUNG & INT’L ASS’N OF PRIVACY PROF’LS (May 2020), 
https://iapp.org/resources/article/iapp-ey-report-privacy-in-wake-of-covid19/ (the target population for the 
survey included in-house privacy and IT professionals. Respondents were solicited via IAPP’s website, emails, 
and social media accounts. Responses were collected between April 8-20, 2020, and 933 respondents 
completed the survey).  
235 Id. at iv.  
236 See, e.g., Novel Coronavirus, ARIZ. STATE UNIV., https://eoss.asu.edu/health/announcements/coronavirus 
(last visited Aug. 12, 2020); COVID-19 News & Resources, STAN. UNIV., https://healthalerts.stanford.edu/ (last 
visited Aug. 12, 2020); COVID-19, UNIV. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN, https://coronavirus.utexas.edu/ (last visited Aug. 
12, 2020); NYU Returns: 2020-2021 Academic Year, N.Y.U., https://www.nyu.edu/life/safety-health-
wellness/coronavirus-information.html (last visited Aug. 12, 2020). 
237 See, e.g., POINT AND CLICK SOLUTIONS, https://www.pointandclicksolutions.com/ (last visited Aug. 15, 
2020). 
238 COVID-19 Response, POINT AND CLICK SOLUTIONS, https://www.pointandclicksolutions.com/covid-19-
response (last visited Aug. 15, 2020). 
239 Id. 
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enables its customers to “manually trace interactions across employees, customers, 
meetings, and locations to identify possible points of transmission.”241 Work allows people 
managers to track their employees’ COVID-19 test results, symptoms, visited locations, 
event attendance, etc., and it allows employees to track their own contacts via dashboard 
visualizations (Figure 4).242 
 




Furthermore, ASU’s University Technology Office embedded a white label health 
monitoring platform, SAFE, into its mobile application (Figure 6).244 The university 
requires all students, staff, and faculty to complete a daily health check, powered by SAFE, 
using the ASU mobile application; the daily health check asks whether the individual is 
experiencing any symptoms or has come in contact with anyone who has experienced 
symptoms of COVID-19.245 Failure to complete the daily health checks may result in the 
suspension of access to university systems, tools, and resources.246 
 
 
241 Protect Your Workforce with Manual Contact Tracing Solutions, WORK.COM, 
https://www.salesforce.com/products/contact-tracing/overview/?d=cta-body-promo-112 (last visited Aug. 12, 
2020).  
242 Salesforce.com, Work.com Demo, SALESFORCE.COM (Aug. 15, 2020), 
https://www.salesforce.com/form/contact-tracing/demo/?d=cta-header-90.  
243 Id. at 0:19.  
244 See Part I.A.; See also SAFE HEALTH SYSTEMS, INC., supra note 35 and accompanying text. Individuals can 
also complete the daily health checks via an ASU web application or by phone, Mark S. Searle, Required Daily 
Health Check, ASU HEALTH SRVCS (Aug. 11, 2020), https://eoss.asu.edu/health/announcements/coronavirus. 
245 Searle, supra note 244. 
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The three platforms, PointNClick, Work, and SAFE integrate with other ASU systems 
and tools.247 These integrations require the transmission of PI or PHI between them for 
proper functionality. Both PointNClick and Work require individuals—students, staff, and 
faculty—to provide PI, such as locations visited; this is user-inputted data. SAFE, via the 
ASU mobile application, requires individuals to provide PHI—symptom information; this 
is also user-inputted data.  
For queried data, ASU sources data from both internal and external parties. ASU 
sources internal data from other systems and tools to enable the platforms.248 For 
information security purposes, ASU sources IP-data from external data suppliers for 
identity verification.249 Moreover, ASU’s systems and tools will autogenerate PI that is 
used across the network of systems and tools for various purposes, such as information 
security and campus safety.250 
 
247 See, e.g., Christine L. Borgman, Open Data, Grey Data, and Stewardship: Universities at the Privacy 
Frontier, 33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 365, 368 (2018) (“As universities outsource more computing systems and 
services . . . they relinquish . . . control.” I make certain assumptions regarding the integration of systems and 
tools for this article. These assumptions are based on professional knowledge of information technology 
systems and tools, including information security best practices and processes); for example, both systems 
integrate with ASU’s single-sign-on (“SSO”). The SSO data is transmitted between ASU systems and tools to 
authenticate the user’s identity. A more thorough description of ASU’s system and tool integrations are out of 
scope for this article. 
248 E.g., ASU’s student records management system transmits a student’s educational program to determine if 
the student is an on-campus or online student. On-campus students must complete the daily health check. 
249 E.g., ASU sources the geolocation of a user’s IP address to determine whether the individual seeking access 
to the network is truly the owner of the credentials used to login to the system or tool.  
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 SAFE requires user-inputted data. But while PointNClick and Work were 
deployed for contact tracing purposes, these systems require more than the user-inputted 
data. Considering the totality of the PI and PHI collected, stored, and used by ASU, whether 
user-inputted, queried, or autogenerated data, there are two risks worth detailing: the risk 
of (i) a data breach, and (ii) function creep. 
 ASU, and likely every university, is at risk for a data breach because it collects, 
stores, and uses vast amounts of PI, PHI, and other data.251 Universities are the third highest 
sector for data breaches in the United States because they maintain in-depth and diverse 
data sets regarding its students, staff, faculty, and research.252 They have already seen state-
sponsored cyberattacks—China sponsored a cyberattack against American universities in 
an attempt to steal intellectual property and research related to the pandemic.253 In April 
2019, hackers stole PI of students, staff, and faculty from Georgia Institute of Technology, 
and in 2017, Washington State University was breached and 1.1 million individuals’ PHI 
was compromised.254 The pandemic-related increase in the collection, storage, and use of 
PI and PHI and the rapid deployment of the technologies have increased the data breach 
risk.  
 But the risks extend beyond data breaches and the theft of PI and PHI for 
individuals. PointNClick, Work, and SAFE collect PI and PHI that was not previously 
collected by ASU—contacts, events attended, daily symptom checks, COVID-19 status, 
etc. While ASU may not retain the data indefinitely, other organizations deploying similar 
efforts may, and considering the likelihood that the data will be retained by the organization 
after the pandemic, the potential for misuse and abuse multiplies when the organization 
aggregates the data and applies ML/AI to the data sets.255 For example, while the data is 
collected for the health monitoring of students, staff, and faculty, the data could be used 
for university research purposes.256 
 Under Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and normal circumstances, this data 
collection and usage would be unlawful or unconstitutional. While these platforms do not 
automatically collect geolocation data, like in Carpenter and Riley, the intimacy and 
amount of data (geolocation and health monitoring PI and PHI) would make the data 
collection and usage initiatives unconstitutional because “it [would] achieve near perfect 
surveillance.”257 If an automated geolocation feature were activated on SAFE, for example, 
the contact tracing data would reveal highly sensitive information about ASU’s students, 
staff, and faculty because it would generate “a precise, comprehensive record of a person’s 
 
251 See Borgman, supra note 247, at 368.  
252 Id. at 405. 
253 See, e.g., Ellen Nakashima & Devlin Barrett, U.S. Accuses China of Sponsoring Criminal Hackers Targeting 
Coronavirus Vaccine Research, WASH. POST (July 21, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-
security/us-china-covid-19-vaccine-research/2020/07/21/8b6ca0c0-cb58-11ea-91f1-
28aca4d833a0_story.html.  
254 10,000 Breaches Later: Top Five Education Data Breaches, IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR. (Aug. 17, 2020, 
7:04 PM), https://www.idtheftcenter.org/10000-breaches-later-top-five-education-data-breaches/.  
255 See Borgman, supra note 247, at 401.  
256 Borgman, supra note 247, at 400-01. 
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public movements”, similar to the comprehensive GPS monitoring that occurred in 
Jones.258 
But in the age of COVID-19, this data collection and usage should not surprise 
students, staff, and faculty. While ASU has communicated its objectives with respect to 
PointNClick, Work, and SAFE to students, staff, and faculty, privacy expectations remain, 
albeit these expectations shifted since the start of the pandemic. Before the pandemic, 
students, staff, and faculty likely would have been concerned with the university’s data 
collection because survey data suggests the overall privacy concerns of health data.259 
Before the pandemic, the objective and subjective points on the Continuum likely would 
have been in Quadrants III or IV, but the pandemic shifted these points to Quadrant II. 
Individuals have lower subjective privacy expectations.260 And given the knowledge of and 
experience with the pandemic, the objective point—the reasonableness of privacy 
expectations—is lower. If an individual were to claim a higher expectation of privacy on 
the Continuum—a subjective point in Quadrant III or IV—with respect to her pandemic-
related PHI, such expectations would now be unreasonable because the reasonable person 
has a lower privacy expectation.261 
Regardless of where the objective and subjective points fall on the Continuum, the 
compelling government interest in protecting the public health and safety would set aside 
the privacy expectations under the special needs doctrine.262 ASU, as a public university, 
is subject to the Fourth Amendment as a public actor, and like in Skinner, where the drug 
testing program’s intent was to protect public safety, ASU’s COVID-19 programs have the 
same intent. Moreover, under HIPAA, ASU, as both a covered entity and a business 
associate, could invoke the public health exemptions.263 
The special needs doctrine would also apply to any common law trespass claim under 
the Fourth Amendment. Under the common law trespass doctrine, an individual could 
claim a Fourth Amendment violation because the university effectively requires students, 
staff, and faculty to download the ASU mobile application to their personal phones.264 By 
effectively forcing the download and installation of a health monitoring application onto 
one’s personal property, ASU would be unconstitutionally conducting a search via its 
monitoring. While the claim would have merit under normal circumstances, during the 
pandemic, the special needs doctrine would set this claim aside, even without considering 
the subjective and objective points on the Continuum.  
For public actors, like universities, contact tracing and health monitoring applications 
and platforms pose privacy and security risks for individuals. Despite the risks of function 
creep and data breaches, these applications and platforms are lawful and constitutional 
 
258 Jones, 565 U.S. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); ASU has not activated the automated geolocation feature 
as of November 2020. 
259 See Madden, supra note 65, at 7 and accompanying text. 
260 See Part II.C.; See also Madden, supra note 206 and accompanying text. 
261 See Part II.C.; See also Ghose, supra note 212 and accompanying text. 
262 See supra Part II.B. 
263 See supra Part II.A. 
264 A common law trespass claim would not apply to ASU-provided devices, only personal devices. ASU allows 
for the completion of the daily health checks via a web portal or by phone. Students, staff, and faculty are not 
required to download the ASU mobile application. A common law trespass claim would likely consider these 
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because the pandemic shifted privacy expectations and the reasonableness of those 
expectations—the subjective and objective points on the Continuum. Moreover, they are 
lawful and constitutional under the government’s compelling interest in protecting the 
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V. THE INEFFECTIVENESS AND UNWORKABILITY OF THE REASONABLE 
EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY STANDARD AND RECLAIMING THE RIGHT TO 
PRIVACY 
 
The pandemic revealed the ineffectiveness and unworkability of the reasonable 
expectation of privacy standard. The shift in the objective and subjective points on the 
Continuum show that privacy expectations are not constant—they change over time and in 
response to personal and societal experiences and knowledge. This is one of two faults with 
the reasonable expectation of privacy standard; it presumes that privacy expectations 
remain constant over time, and that a reasonable person maintains a well-informed and 
development set of privacy expectations.265 But the need for privacy is constant.  
Section A explains the faults and why the standard will not protect individuals’ data 
privacy and security. And Section B proposes a new legal standard that would protect data 
privacy and security regardless of shifting expectations.  
 
A. The Ineffective and Unworkable Katz Standard 
 
The COVID-19 pandemic illustrated the ineffectiveness and unworkability of the 
reasonable expectation of privacy standard. The shift in the objective and subjective points 
on the Continuum show that privacy expectations are not constant—they change over time. 
Yet, the need for privacy does not disappear. Moreover, there are two faults with the 
reasonable expectation of privacy standard: it presumes that (i) privacy expectations remain 
relatively constant over time, and (ii) a reasonable person maintains a well-informed and 
developed set of privacy expectations.266 This Section A explains these faults and why the 
standard will not protect individuals’ data privacy and security over time.  
The need for privacy is constant. Even though the subjective and objective points 
shifted, the risks associated with the unauthorized access, use, or dissemination of PI and 
PHI have not changed since the pandemic began. For instance, the pandemic did not 
suddenly change the risks associated with unauthorized use of one’s geolocation data—
malicious actors prior to and during the pandemic can use the geolocation data to identify 
one’s social connections, political affiliations, and the like.267 The need for privacy remains 
constant because the inherent value of PI and PHI to the individual is unchanged—the 
value of one’s PHI did not change with the onset of the pandemic.  
The reasonable expectation of privacy standard does not incorporate the values and 
risks of PI and PHI. The reduction of subjective privacy expectations given the pandemic, 
under the reasonable expectation of privacy standard, any unauthorized or malicious 
access, use, or dissemination of PI or PHI may not result in a privacy violation or 
infringement in the eyes of the law.268 In Carpenter, intimate cell phone location data was 
considered so private that obtaining such data requires a warrant by law enforcement.269 
 
265 See Jones, 565 U.S. at 427 (Alito, J., concurring). 
266 Id.  
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The shift in the objective point on the Continuum, the same intimate data collected and 
used for contact tracing may not be considered as sensitive as it was in Carpenter. But it is 
the exact same data. 
Justices Alito, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan recognized the reasonable expectation of 
privacy standard assumes stability in privacy expectations; in Jones, the concurrence stated 
that the reasonable expectation of privacy standard is flawed because it “rests on the 
assumption that this hypothetical person has a well-developed and stable set of privacy 
expectations.”270 But the pandemic introduced instability—the objective and subjective 
points shifted.  
As technology advances, privacy expectations change—leading to significant changes 
in “popular attitudes” regarding privacy.271 The prevailing “popular attitude” may differ 
from person to person—this shows the fault in that the reasonable expectation of privacy 
standard presumes a well-informed set of privacy expectations. Judges are apt to confuse 
their own privacy expectations with those of the reasonable person under Katz.272 Judges 
may have different knowledge and sets of experiences that shape their placement of the 
objective point on the Continuum. Since the reasonable expectation of privacy is a function 
of knowledge and experience, what is knowledgeable to a well-educated judge is 
significantly different than the ordinary person.273  
This prompts the question as to whether the reasonable expectation of privacy will 
diminish to a point where there is no expectation of privacy. Likely not, but nonetheless, 
the value and risks remain. Accordingly, the need for privacy protections remain. This calls 
for a new legal standard—the right to control.  
 
B. Reclaiming the Right to Privacy with a New Legal Standard and 
Legislative Action 
 
There are two priorities to reclaim the right to data privacy and security. The first is to 
replace the reasonable expectation of privacy test from Katz with a more robust standard. 
The second is comprehensive forward-thinking data privacy and security legislation from 
Congress. This Section B proposes a new standard—the right to control—to replace the 
ineffective and unworkable reasonable expectation of privacy standard. Further, this 
section implores Congress to enact comprehensive data privacy and security legislation to 
protect individuals, their PI, and their PHI. 
The right to control would be the effective and workable standard to replace the 
reasonable expectation of privacy standard. It would ask whether an individual’s right to 
control his data, its privacy, and its security was violated or infringed.  
Unlike the reasonable expectation of privacy standard, where objective and subjective 
privacy expectations may wane over time, the right to control standard would not weaken 
when privacy expectations shift because the standard relies on tangible control, not 
intangible and fluctuating expectations. As Justice Alito said in Jones, the reasonable 
 
270 Jones, 565 U.S. at 427 (Alito, J., concurring).  
271 Id. 
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expectation of privacy standard presumes stability, but under a right to control standard, 
stability would be a non-issue because an individual gets to determine the control of her 
own data.274 The reasonable expectation of privacy considers the external factors—what 
are the reasonable expectations of privacy of an objective person—where knowledge and 
experience weigh heavily on the determination. The right to control standard would not 
consider these external factors because it would be solely dependent on whether the 
individual’s right to control his data was infringed. The right to control would be an 
affirmative civil right not subject to the reasonable person objective standard. 
Further, the right to control standard incorporates and appreciates the inherent value of 
the PI or PHI—individuals get to control their data based on the value they place on their 
information. For example, as previously mentioned, individuals may have different levels 
of sensitivity regarding their sexual history—some would place their sexual history on 
Quadrant IV and others would place it in Quadrant II or III on the Continuum.275 Under the 
right to control standard, the individual reclaims the right to determine where a category of 
her data falls on the Continuum for herself unlike under the reasonable expectation of 
privacy standard where the data collector makes the determination subject to any 
constitutional or statutory protections.  
 Changing the standard is necessary, but not sufficient in comprehensively 
protecting individuals’ PI and PHI. Congress must pass comprehensive data privacy and 
security legislation. Congress recognizes the need to do so. Prior to and during the 
pandemic, members of Congress proposed various data privacy and security bills.276 But 
these privacy and security bills fail to gain traction in Congress.277 
Congress cannot turn to the industry to self-regulate or provide proposals for data 
privacy and security legislation for two reasons. First, as idealistic companies age, 
companies exchange governmental regulation for governmental protection. For instance, 
with Facebook, Mark Zuckerberg invites government regulation because such regulation 
would protect Facebook’s monopoly on social media.278 This is no different than Theodore 
Vail, the former president of AT&T, submitting to government regulation in the 1910s that 
allowed AT&T to dominate for decades.279  
Second, while organizations may self-regulate, the number of high-profile data privacy 
lapses and data breaches show a private market failure.280 The fundamental issue with self-
regulation is the conflict of interest that exists—the regulators are the regulated.281 Here, 
 
274 Jones, 565 U.S. at 427 (Alito, J., concurring). 
275 See Part II.B. 
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actually protecting individuals’ PI and PHI by improving privacy and security practices 
(e.g., prohibiting the processing and dissemination of data) conflicts with the regulators’ 
(the organizations themselves) source of revenue.282 More simply, it is counterintuitive for 
organizations to improve their privacy and security capabilities if the improvements 
negatively impact their revenue and profits.283 
Therefore, Congress needs to act comprehensively. While this article does not 
exhaustively list all of the rights, protections, and obligations that must be created with 
Congressional action, the legislation should preempt the states to prevent a patchwork of 
varying levels of protection.284 It must include a private right of action that will allow 
individuals to seek redress, but the private right of action should be limited by procedural 
filters, such as an opportunity to cure an alleged violation, to avoid unnecessary and 
meritless litigation.285 And the legislation should be data-subject-centric—meaning that the 
drafting must protect individuals and their data, not an organization’s revenue or profits. A 
data-subject-centric approach can be achieved by establishing duties of loyalty and care 
onto organizations for the benefit of individuals.286 Lastly, the legislation must recognize 
the three types of data (user-inputted, queried, and autogenerated) and data supply chains 
to effectively provide data privacy and security protections end-to-end. 
By changing the legal standard from the reasonable expectation of privacy to the right 
to control, individuals reclaim data privacy and security. Congress must act in passing 
comprehensive data privacy, and security legislation to create effective and necessary 
protections because the need for personal privacy and security is always present. 
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The COVID-19 pandemic has thrusted health surveillance technologies into the 
spotlight, and with the technologies, the data privacy and security issues that come with 
them. The collection, use, and dissemination of PI and PHI is necessary to combat the virus 
and slow the spread. But as organizations move to deploy these technologies, we must 
consider the types of data and existence of data supply chains to fully understand the 
totality of privacy and security risks.  
With the totality of understanding, we can evaluate the effectiveness and workability 
of current legal standards and protections. The pandemic revealed the ineffectiveness and 
unworkability of the reasonable expectation of privacy standard because the objective and 
subjective points on the Continuum shifted. To truly protect individuals’ data privacy and 
security, the legal standard must change to a right to control, and Congress must act to pass 
comprehensive data privacy and security legislation because “invasions upon [an 
individual’s] privacy, subject [the individual] to mental pain and distress, far greater than 
could be inflicted by mere bodily injury.”287 
 
287 Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 196 (1890). 
